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What is this text?
My )rst paper on formal topology [32] was sent to the publisher )fteen years ago.
It was the result of two years of intense work, in close collaboration with Per Martin-
L2of. Since then, I never ceased to think and lecture about formal topology, and to
discuss it with several people, mainly with Martin-L2of, Silvio Valentini (since 1991)
and Thierry Coquand (since 1993), but later also with Giovanni Curi, Silvia Gebellato
and Milly Maietti. I thank all of them, and all other people with whom formal topology
has been shared. 1
Since )fteen years ago, a lot has changed in formal topology, in technical and in
conceptual understanding. Indeed, developing formal topology in a strictly constructive
way, that is over an intuitionistic and predicative foundation (such as Martin-L2of ’s type
theory, see below for a short introduction), has forced me to develop an alternative
mathematical intuition and has helped me to reach a new global attitude towards the
foundations of mathematics.
When I )rst gave a full course on formal topology, in Padua in 1990, I also )rst
conceived the idea of writing a book on it. My manuscripts and typescripts have in-
creased in number and length since then. However, in December 1995 it happened
that I was able to materialize my new foundational attitude into a new fragment of
mathematical thought, and I discovered what I called the basic picture: a clear, very
simple structure underlying topology and consisting of symmetries and logical duali-
ties. Mathematically, the basic picture is a natural generalization of topology, obtained
by considering relations rather than functions as transformations. For the debate on
foundations, it should be interesting that it is well visible only over an intuitionis-
tic and predicative foundation, and this probably explains why it was not noticed
before.
E-mail address: sambin@math.unipd.it (G. Sambin).
1 I also thank Giovanni Curi, Per Martin-L2of and Peter Schuster for comments which have been useful in
the revision of a )rst draft.
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The discovery of the basic picture caused a radical and extensive reformulation of
formal topology itself, in particular by the introduction of a binary positivity predicate,
the presence of co-induction and the generalization to nondistributive topology. This
long paper contains the principles and the comments which I consider useful for the
actual further development of this reformulation (and thus also of the book, whose
writing has to be postponed). My ideal reader here is a colleague sincerely interested
in constructive topology, including its conceptual motivations up to philosophical gen-
eralizations. So my aims are:
1. to give information on what has been done in formal topology since [32], and to
give answers to some of the frequently asked questions about formal topology;
2. to show how the basic picture serves as the starting point for a new conception and
a new technical development of constructive topology;
3. to verbalize my present understanding of how and why one should develop mathe-
matics in a way which is diCerent from usual ones.
These three items correspond to the three sections below, which can be read in any
order. Readers less familiar with pointfree topology could look at the )rst parts of
Section 2 and at Section 3.2.2 for some help.
The percentage of comments and personal opinions will be higher than what is to
be expected according to a well-established tradition. I hope the readers (at least two,
so that I can use “they” or “them” with no reference to gender) will forgive me and
think that my eCort of giving a general picture was worthwhile.
Some ideas about type theory
Martin-L2of ’s type theory [27] (henceforth type theory) aims at a constructive foun-
dation of mathematics, which is alternative to usual axiomatic set theories such as ZFC
and to categorical universes like topoi. I explain my reasons for choosing type theory
as a foundation in part 3, and I show how this can be done in practice in Section 1.3.1.
I recall here very brieHy (and necessarily with imprecisions and gaps) some general
facts about type theory, in particular those which make it diCerent from ZFC or from
topos theory. My aim is just to warn the readers, and possibly make them curious to
learn more.
The name “type theory” is due to the fact that any entity goes together with its
(logical) type. To know that A is a set means that we know by which rules all its
elements are formed; these rules must be in front of us, hence in )nite number, and
cannot change with time.
If we know that A is a set, then we know the rules to produce its elements, and
so clearly to say that a is an element of A means that a is produced by the rules; we
write a∈A. In type theory one considers also objects which are not elements of a set,
but rather belong to a collection, or logical type (or category in [27]). Two typical and
important examples are the collection of subsets of a given set (see Section 1.3.1) and
the collection of all sets (or propositions).
We can be in the position of knowing that B(a) is a set, on the assumption that a
is an element of a set A; this is called a family of sets indexed by A, and written B(a)
set (a∈A). Similarly, we can be in the position of knowing that b(a) is an element
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of a set B, on the assumption that a∈A; this is just our notion of function from A to
B, and is written b(a)∈B (a∈A). More generally, if B is not a set but a family of
sets depending on an index set A, b(a)∈B(a) (a∈A) means that we know b(a) to be
an element of B(a) whenever a∈A. By abstracting on the variable a, we obtain the
elements of a new set (x∈A)B(x), called the direct product. If c∈ (x∈A)B(x) and
a∈A, by applying c to a, we obtain an element of B(a), which we here denote again
by c(a). In the special case in which B does not depend on A, the direct product is
denoted by A→B; if c∈A→B and a∈A, then c(a)∈B.
All other de)nitions of sets in type theory are given in a similar way. In partic-
ular, given a set A and a family B(a) set (a∈A), we can form the disjoint union
(x∈A)B(x), whose canonical elements are pairs 〈a; b〉 with a∈A and b∈B(a). The
special case in which B does not depend on A gives the cartesian product A× B, the
set of ordered pairs from A and B.
The standard formulation of type theory, as in [27] or [30], includes the interpreta-
tion of propositions as sets. So the judgement that P is a proposition obeys formally
the same rules as the judgement that P is a set, reading p∈P as p is a veri)cation,
or proof of P. In the proposition-as-set interpretation, (x∈A)B(x) is identi)ed with
(∀x∈A)B(x) and (x∈A)B(x) with (∃x∈A)B(x), also in the sense that logical infer-
ence rules are just another reading of the rules for corresponding sets. When B does
not depend on A, (∀x∈A)B(x) becomes implication A⊃B, here often written also as
A→B, and (x∈A)B(x) becomes conjunction A&B. But this justi)cation of logic is
not necessary in formal topology; a treatment of logic which is distinct from the theory
of sets is equally good, as long as it satis)es the rules of intuitionistic logic.
The only way to give a constructive proof that a certain property P holds for all
the in)nitely many elements of a set A, that is the only way to give meaning to a
universal quanti)cation over an in)nite domain A, is by proving that P holds on an
element only by virtue of its possible forms, which are only )nitely many, that is one
for each rule of A.
Type theory is quite diCerent from an axiomatic theory of sets, such as ZF or ZFC.
Using ZF as a foundation means assuming that ZF has a model, and this model is
taken as a universe of all sets, in which mathematics is done using only the properties
of sets as speci)ed by the axioms. But such universe is considered as given, and thus
there is no information on how the sets, and hence all other mathematical entities, are
built up. When topos theory is assumed as a foundation, the universe is assumed to
be a topos, and in this sense the situation is similar even if less properties are valid.
In type theory, the universe in which mathematics is done is built up in the same
time as mathematics is built up. In practice, this means that whenever we use any-
thing, we have total information about it, or total knowledge of what it is and by which
ingredients it has been built up (while in ZF everything is reduced to only one ingre-
dient, viz. sets, and only one relation, viz. membership). Note that this methodological
request is not at all as unreasonable and diMcult to ful)l as an education inside the
ZF tradition might lead one to believe. On the contrary, it is very natural and simple
when any entity must be constructed: indeed, it is enough to keep information about it
in the same moment it is constructed. In type theory, the control of information is so
strict that any proof of any statement is automatically also an algorithm, or computer
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program ful)lling that statement. This is the main source of strong interest in type
theory by the computer science community.
In the classical approach, information is often lost in an irreversible way. An im-
portant example is the distinction between subset and characteristic function. Here a
subset U of a set S is just a property, or propositional function U (x) prop (x∈ S); we
write as usual U ⊆ S. Note that a subset is never a set, because of the type diCerence.
If the collection of subsets is identi)ed with the set of functions S→{0; 1}, namely
characteristic functions, as it is done in ZF or in a boolean topos, then any subset U
becomes decidable, in the sense that for each x∈ S one can decide whether U (x) is
true or not by calculating the characteristic function at x.
Here the collection of subsets of a set S is not a set, since by the well known
phenomenon of diagonalization there is no way to give a )nite stock of rules prescribing
all the possible forms which all subsets should have (see [39]). This is what—in formal
terms—blocks impredicativity, that is quanti)cations over subsets to produce a new
proposition, or subset: simply, the subsets of a set do not form a set.
Note that it is not just a matter of names: one could call collections as “big sets” and
sets as “tiny sets”, or any other similar variation. The crucial point remains that a quan-
ti)cation over tiny sets does not produce a tiny set. This distinction is what makes the
strict control of information at all possible. In particular, it allows to justify strong rules
for disjoint unions, or for the existential quanti)er. They permit to obtain, inside the
formal system, two projection functions p, q which applied to a proof c∈ (∃x∈A)B(x)
produce an element p(c)∈A and the proof that B holds on it, q(c)∈B(p(c)). This
allows to justify also the axiom of choice: if (∀x∈A)(∃y∈B)C(x; y) is provable, then
also (∃f∈A→B)(∀x∈A)C(x; fx) is provable (see [27]).
This justi)cation of the axiom of choice rests on the proposition-as-set interpretation.
So, if logic is given independently of set theory, the axiom of choice is no longer justi-
)ed. But the examples in which the axiom of choice is necessary seem, by experience,
to be rare enough in formal topology that one can point them out case by case.
To be able to actually develop mathematics over type theory, one needs a number
of tools, mainly notation and some auxiliary de)nitions, which are introduced in Sec-
tion 1.3.1 below. I suggest the readers to read that section to be able to understand
the notation which is used here from now on and which is by now standard in formal
topology.
1. Some remarks, some results
In this section, I discuss the motivation of formal topology (Section 1.1), I justify
the original de)nition and answer to some questions about it (Section 1.2), and brieHy
review the developments up to present (Section 1.3). The new approach to formal
topology, which I have called the basic picture, will be treated in Section 2.
1.1. The point of formal topology
A topological space is classically de)ned (cf. e.g. [22,15]) as a pair (X;OX ) where
X is a set, whose elements x; y; : : : are called points, and OX is a family of subsets
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of X , which contains ∅; X and is closed under )nite intersections and arbitrary unions.
The family OX is called a topology on the space X and the subsets in OX are said to
be open.
The conditions on OX are written more precisely as:
O1 ∅; X ∈OX ,
O2 for any E; F; ⊆X , if E; F ∈OX then E ∩F ∈OX ,
O3 for any family of subsets F, if F⊆OX , then ⋃F∈OX .
This formulation of the notion of topological space is unacceptable, as it stands, from
a predicative point of view, since apparently a quanti)cation not only over subsets, but
over families of subsets (hence of the third order) is to be used. Though usually this
is given meaning by conceiving the collection of subsets as a completed totality, we
now see that actually no intrinsic impredicativity is involved, and that one can easily
)nd a de)nition of topological space which is fully acceptable also predicatively.
A collection of subsets, and OX is one such, is most simply given in type theory as
a set-indexed family, that is a function, which we call ext, from some set, which we
call S, into PX . In this way a quanti)cation over open subsets—we cannot dispense
with it in topology—can be reduced to a quanti)cation over the set S.
However, one cannot expect ext to give all open subsets as values; the special
case in which OX is the whole of PX—the discrete topology—would require PX to
become indexed by the set S, and this is not welcome in type theory. 2 Moreover, the
expression of O3 would still require an impredicative quanti)cation.
These diMculties are solved by asking the family ext(a)⊆X (a∈ S) to be a base for
the topology. Thus subsets ext(a) are called (basic) neighbourhoods, and open subsets
are de)ned as arbitrary unions of neighbourhoods. That is, a subset D of X is open if
and only if D= ext(U ) for some U ⊆ S, where ext(U )≡ ⋃b U ext(b). Without loss
of generality, 3 we may assume that the usual conditions on bases are satis)ed in the
sense that S is provided with a binary operation · and with a distinguished element 1
such that
ext(1) = X and ext(a) ∩ ext(b) = ext(a · b)
The resulting structure is called a concrete space (in [32, example 2.1]), or a concrete
presentation of a topological space.
From our constructive point of view, this de)nition is certainly acceptable, but not
suMcient to develop topology. One has to add two further notions, that of formal
topology and that of formal point, and hence also that of formal space, as the collection
of all formal points. In fact, in many interesting examples, the collection X of points
of a classical topological space is not given directly as a set, in the constructive sense.
And this may happen also when basic neighbourhoods of X can be given as a family
ext indexed on a set S. The reason for this is that an in)nite amount of information,
2 By adapting to type theory the well-known argument due to Diaconescu, it is shown in [24] that this
would bring to classical logic.
3 This is actually not completely true: for 10 years it has prevented me from seeing an important gener-
alization, see Section 2.
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which means in)nitely many basic neighbourhoods, may be necessary to determine a
point. The idea is then to consider elements a; b; c : : : of S as formal neighbourhoods,
and hence subsets U; V; : : : of S as formal substitutes of open subsets. One has to de)ne,
however, when two subsets of S are topologically equivalent, that is when they produce
the same open subset. This leads to the de)nition of formal topology, which thus is
a speci)c structure on the set of formal neighbourhoods. Then an in)nite amount of
information can be given by a subset  of S, and when  has some properties which
make it formally similar to a point, it will be called a formal point.
The method to obtain the de)nition of a formal notion, those of formal topology
and formal point to begin with, is always the same, and it can be described as formed
by three steps:
1. Study the notion to be de)ned in the presentable case, in which both a set of points
X and a set of formal neighbourhoods S are present. This allows to choose some
new primitives to be added to the formal side, in view of step 2.
2. Analyse the structure induced on the formal side, and write down all those properties
of the primitives on S which can be expressed without mentioning the points of X .
Of course, the best choice of primitives is that which allows to describe the original
concrete notion in the best possible way.
3. Abandon points altogether, and retain those properties of formal primitives as an
axiomatic de)nition.
We apply this method )rst of all to obtain the de)nition of formal topology itself.
In the concretely presentable case, two subsets U , V of S correspond to the same open
subset of X when extV = extU . To express this in pointfree terms, it is enough to
express extV ⊆ extU , and this in turn, by the de)nition extV = ⋃a  V ext a, reduces
to (∀a  V )(ext a⊆ extU ). So we add an in)nitary relation a✁U as primitive, with the
idea that it corresponds to ext a⊆ extU ; using it one can de)ne V ✁U ≡ (∀a  V )(a✁
U ), which then corresponds to extV ⊆ extU , and )nally V=✁U ≡V ✁U &U ✁V
will correspond to extV = extU .
The distinguished element 1 and the operation · are also kept, and the idea is that
ext1 =X and that ext(a · b) = ext a∩ ext b. Finally, we also add a unary predicate
Pos(a) prop (a∈ S), whose meaning in the concrete case is that ext a is inhabited;
in fact, this is constructively not reducible to ext a = ∅. The result of applying now
steps 2 and 3 of the method above is the de)nition of formal topology given in next
section.
The method by which we reached the de)nition says that any concrete space gives
a formal topology, which is then called (concretely) presentable. But note that not all
formal topologies are presentable; 4 if it were so, their introduction would be much less
motivated. A detailed discussion of the motivations for the introduction of the notion
of formal topology is in Section 3.2.2.
4 An example of non-presentable formal topology is given in [9], but simpler, )nite examples can be
built up.
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1.2. A formal topology is: : :
The )rst result of the method described in the previous section is the de)nition of
formal topology itself. The following is a minor variant (but equivalent from many
aspects) 5 of the original in [32]:
Denition 1. A formal topology S consists of:
a set S,
a distinguished element 1 and a binary operation · on S,
a relation ✁ between elements and subsets of S, called (formal) cover, which for
arbitrary a; b∈ S, U; V ⊆ S satis)es:
reHexivity
a  U
a✁ U
;
transitivity
a✁ U U ✁ V
a✁ V
where U ✁ V ≡ (∀b  U )b✁ V;
·-Left a✁ U
a · b✁ U
a✁ U
b · a✁ U ;
·-Right a✁ U a✁ V
a✁ U · V where U · V ≡ {a · b: a  U; b  V};
top a✁ 1;
a predicate Pos(a) on S, called positivity predicate, which for arbitrary a∈ S,
U ⊆ S satis)es:
monotonicity
Pos(a) a✁ U
(∃bU )Pos(b) ;
positivity
Pos(a) → a✁ U
a✁ U
:
A frequently asked question about formal topology is whether quanti)cation over
subsets is really avoided; the claim is that the very de)nition of formal topology
involves a quanti)cation over subsets. The crucial point is of course the use of “for
arbitrary U”, especially in a formalistic reading of the de)nition. The answer is that
we use subset variables as arguments of (higher order) functions, that is we do not use
them to build up new propositions (that is, new subsets) of the form ∀U : : :, but keep
always the quanti)cation at the meta-level (formally: subset variables remain free).
So the de)nition with all details should read:
Denition 2. A formal topology S consists of:
a set S, which is determined by specifying its introduction and elimination
rules;
5 The aim of this variant is to avoid problems connected with equality; usually (S; ·; 1) is assumed to be a
monoid or a semilattice, which is expressible only using equality of S. Equivalence holds in the sense that
putting a =C b≡ (aC {b}& bC {a}), one can show that (S; ·; 1;=C) is a semilattice.
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a distinguished element 1 and a binary operation · on S, that is a · b∈ S
(a∈ S; b∈ S);
a relation ✁ between elements and subsets of S, that is a✁U prop (a∈ S; U ⊆ S)
(which will be de)ned as usual for any proposition by furnishing introduction
and elimination rules, either directly or indirectly by means of an expression
like a logical formula, of which we already know that it produces proposi-
tions), and six functions re4, trans, l1, l2, t and r of the convenient types which
satisfy:
reHexivity re4(a; U ) ∈ U (a) → a✁ U (a ∈ S; U ⊆ S);
transitivity trans(a; U; V ) ∈ a✁ U &U ✁ V → a✁ V (a ∈ S; U; V ⊆ S);
·-Left l1(a; b; U; V ) ∈ a✁ U → a · b✁ V (a ∈ S; U ⊆ S)
l2(a; b; U; V ) ∈ a✁ U → b · a✁ V (a ∈ S; U ⊆ S);
·-Right r(a; U; V ) ∈ a✁ U & a✁ V → a✁ U · V (a∈ S; U; V ⊆ S);
top t(a) ∈ a✁ 1;
a predicate Pos(a) on S, that is Pos(a) prop (a∈ S), and two functions m and
p which satisfy:
monotonicity m(a; U ) ∈ Pos(a) & a✁ U → (∃bU )Pos(b) (a ∈ S; U ⊆ S);
positivity p(a; U ) ∈ (Pos(a) → a✁ U ) → a✁ U (a ∈ S; U ⊆ S):
This formalistic de)nition (with proof-terms spelled out to please a computer lan-
guage) has absolutely no quanti)cation over subsets. I never wrote it explicitly before,
because I assumed it was understood. 6 The notation with hidden proof-terms is more
suitable to human mathematicians. Keeping explicit track of all the proof-terms, that
is of computational content, would impede a more abstract understanding, or at least
would make it much harder. 7 In any speci)c example, of course, one has to produce, at
least in principle, all the required information, so including the functions in variant 1.2,
simply to be sure that one has actually given an example of formal topology.
The apparent quanti)cation over subsets needed in the de)nition of formal topology
is of the same kind as the quanti)cation over propositions A, B which is needed to
understand a simple inference rule such as
A
A ∨ B :
In fact, one understands here that the rule applies to any propositions A and B, but
nobody has ever questioned whether a second-order quanti)cation is here involved,
since it is clear that the quanti)cation involved remains at the metalevel.
However, one must be extremely careful on this topic, since not all quanti)cations
at the metalevel are equally innocent. Let me )rst recall one aspect of the intuitionistic
6 De)nition 2 was given for the )rst time explicitly in my talk at TYPES’98, Kloster Irsee, together with
the comments given in this section.
7 To be pedantic, this is an example of the forget-restore principle (see Section 3.1.3): one should make
sure that hiding the proof-terms of all the propositions does not prevent us from obtaining them back when
wished. This is possible because all proofs will be intuitionistic, and thus preserve proof-terms.
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meaning of quanti)ers. The meaning of a statement of the form (∀x∈ S)A(x) in intu-
itionistic terms is that we have a method proving A(a) for every a∈ S. So the meaning
of (∀x∈ S)(∃y∈ S)A(x; y) is that we have a method which applies to any a∈ S and
produces a proof of (∃y∈ S)A(a; y), that is an element c, depending on a, such that
A(a; c) holds.
It seems to me that there is no other way to give constructive meaning to a universal-
existential statement, also when quanti)ers are meant to be kept at the metalevel. So
I am able to grasp that “for every U ⊆ S, there exists b such that A(U; b)” holds only
when I have a function F such that A(U; F(U )) holds for every U ⊆ S. One can debate
whether this function should always be expressible within the language. But assuming
that the meaning of “for every U there exists b” is always predicatively clear (which
is implicit when such a combination of quanti)ers is used to de)ne an object, like a
subset) amounts to assuming that the function F can be obtained always, and that it is
expressible in the language, which means that a second-order axiom of choice of the
kind ∀U∃bA(U; b)→∃F∀UA(U; F(U )) must hold. But then this brings us immediately
to classical logic (see [24] for the precise statement and proof of this fact).
This is an example of a “powerful” principle which actually destroys the quality of
information or equivalently, at least in my own case, which destroys the possibility
of an intuitive grasping (see Section 3.1.3). A consequence is that in formal topology
one will always )nd directly the function F , and never the combination “for every U ,
there exists b” (or “for every U , there exists W ”) to which it gives meaning (see for
instance the case of the de)nition of U ↓V in Section 2.1).
Another critique to the de)nition of formal topology is that: : : there are too many
diCerent de)nitions. I would just like to recall that even what now looks as the most
stable de)nition of (usual) topology, namely that of topological space, is actually the
result of a long historical process, which stabilized relatively recently. One advantage
of the variant given above is explained in footnote 5. Two further variants will be
introduced in Sections 2.1 and 2.4, together with some good reasons to do it.
1.3. A summary of developments
Starting from the de)nition of formal topology, the paper [32] contains other basic
de)nitions (formal open, formal point, formal space, continuous function,: : :) some
technical tools (connection with closure operators,: : :), and several examples (Scott
domains, Stone representations, choice sequences, real numbers,: : :); it also begins the
use of inductive methods in topology, which is peculiar to formal topology. I have
grouped the subsequent developments under seven headings, as follows. I do not insist
on details, or any kind of information like dates and credits, whenever there is a good
source for this. As often happens, the oMcial dates of publication do not correspond
to the time things were )rst discovered.
1.3.1. A toolbox to do mathematics in type theory
In the preface of [32] it was said that a subset is just a propositional function, but the
adherence to this principle in the subsequent development was not based on a rigorous
and full formalization in type theory. A satisfactory understanding, both in practical
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and in formal terms, came only a few years later (see [39]), and it mostly con)rmed
the )rst intuitions. Now I believe that a comprehensive book on formal topology should
contain a substantial chapter with a detailed explanation of how mathematics can be
developed in practice using type theory as a foundation.
Using type theory to do mathematics is not so diCerent from using ZF, to the extent
that in both cases one needs a set of tools (de)nitions, macros, notation, abbreviations,
etc.), or toolbox, to avoid clumsy formalities. The tuning up of such a toolbox for
ZF has required some eCort (think for example of the time passed between Zermelo’s
axioms and the formal treatment of ordered pairs). The analogue process for type
theory has started only relatively recently.
The main observation is that in the practice of mathematics one is often not interested
in all the amount of information which type theory is able to preserve (this is also true
for ZF, but to a lesser extent). The general idea is that, however, one should not forget
information in an irreversible way: ideal is the situation when any piece of information
which does not appear explicitly can be restored at will, maybe by passing through the
metalanguage (see [39] and Section 3.1.3 here).
Once the toolbox which is necessary to develop a certain )eld is built up, doing
mathematics in type theory is just doing mathematics: all the boring details of actual
formalization in type theory are taken care of once and for all at the time the toolbox
is implemented. An essential aspect, and a de)nite advantage, of this approach is that
the basic (type) theory is kept )xed, while the toolbox is expanded, and this allows
strati)cation of knowledge and increase of con)dence.
At present, a complete toolbox for subsets 8 has been developed, in [39]. I here
repeat—with mild variations—the bare minimum to be able to read this text. As men-
tioned in the preface, a subset U of a set S is just a propositional function, that is a
proposition U (x) for each x∈ S. We write U ⊆ S as usual. To be able to use spatial
intuition, and to keep closer to mathematical practice, we want to introduce the notion
of element a of a subset U , which we write as a S U (forgetting the subscript when-
ever possible). The idea is that a S U is equivalent to a∈ S and U (a) true. This is
equivalently expressed by the conditions that
(i) (∀x∈ S) (x S U↔U (x)) must be true, that is, when a is known to be in S, a S U
is logically equivalent to U (a), and
(ii) if a S U true, then a∈ S, that is, the proposition a S U true keeps the information
that a∈ S so that there is no need to recover a∈ S from a SU by inspecting the
proof.
These two conditions are satis)ed for instance by setting a S U ≡ Id(S; a; a) &U (a),
where Id is intensional propositional equality (see [30]), but other solutions are possible
and equally good for the purposes we are now discussing. In fact, the theory of subsets
is developed on the basis of the above two conditions only, so that one can ignore
how they are actually implemented in type theory. 9
8 We also know how to deal with quotients and with quanti)cations over )nite subsets.
9 Another consequence is of course that the job of implementation of the whole theory of subsets reduces
to the implementation only of the two conditions, see Section 3.2.1.
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The idea underlying  can also be expressed as the wish to keep the notation
{x∈ S: U (x)}, in the usual sense that a  {x∈ S: U (x)} if and only if a∈ S and
U (a) true. Thus {x∈ S: U (x)} becomes just a “shorthand” for U . Another relevant
fact is that any subset of S is equal (in the sense below) to the image of a set I along a
function f : I→ S, which is de)ned by f[I ]≡{x∈ S: (∃i∈ I)x=f(i)}. So one could
say that the distance between a subset and a set is only one function!
Equality between subsets is extensional. That is, for any U; V ⊆ S inclusion is de)ned
by U ⊆V ≡ (∀x∈ S) (x  U→ x  V ) and then equality by U =V ≡U ⊆V &V ⊆U .
The common pattern behind the de)nition of an operation on subsets is that it
is simply the abstraction, at the level of propositional functions, of a logical constant,
which acts at the level of propositions. For example, intersection ∩ is the abstraction of
conjunction & , that is U ∩V ≡{x∈ S: U (x) &V (x)}. This is not sheer manipulation
of symbols, but making the link between visual intuition and logic explicit; for instance,
the statement: a  U ∩V if and only if a  U and a  V , without notation with  would
be just the de)nitional equation (U ∩V )(x)≡U (x) &V (x), and thus its intuitive value
would be partly lost. Similarly, U ∪ V ≡{x: U (x)∨V (x)} and −U ≡{x : ¬U (x)}
(remind that, because of intuitionistic logic, one cannot expect S =U ∪−U to hold in
general).
A family of subsets of S indexed by a set I , written Ui⊆ S(i∈ I), is just the same
thing (but not the same intuition!) as a binary relation between I and S, that is a
propositional function with two arguments U (i; x) prop (i∈ I; x∈ S). Clearly, equality
of families of subsets is extensional, that is Ui⊆ S(i∈ I) and Vi⊆ S(i∈ I) are said
to be equal if Ui =Vi for each i∈ I . This yields also that two relations are said to
be equal if they hold on the same arguments. All de)nitions and results dealing with
binary relations must be understood up to this equality.
Following the pattern mentioned above, the union of a set-indexed family of subsets
Ui⊆ S(i∈ I) is de)ned by abstracting the existential quanti)er: x 
⋃
i∈I Ui≡ (∃i∈ I)(x 
Ui). Similarly for intersection and universal quanti)er.
The collection of subsets of a set S, equipped with extensional equality, is called
the power of S and is denoted by PS. The above operations give to it the structure of
a frame (or complete Heyting algebra, or locale). A rigorous proof of this is obtained
by noting that, since an operation on subsets is the abstraction of a logical constant,
any informal argument about operations on subsets is always supported by a formal
logical deduction about the corresponding logical constant. For example, the properties
of inclusion with respect to union and intersection, namely
(a)
⋃
i∈I Ui⊆V if and only if for all i∈ I , Ui⊆V
(b) V ⊆ ⋂i∈I Ui if and only if for all i∈ I , V ⊆Ui
are obtained immediately by a shift of quanti)ers.
Since the writing of [39], an important improvement in notation has taken place.
Since the quanti)er ∃ is primitive, and not de)nable by means of ∀, it is convenient
to introduce a notation for the notion which is dual to that of inclusion. That is, for
any U; V ⊆ S we put
U G V ≡ (∃a ∈ S)(a  U&a  V )
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and we read “U meets V ”. Note that U GV is intuitionistically much stronger than
U ∩V = ∅. The property corresponding to (a) and (b) above is:
(c)
⋃
i∈I Ui GV iC there exists i∈ I such that Ui GV .
We will see in Section 2 that the notation G is very useful for the expression of some
fundamental mathematical properties.
One can de)ne singletons by {a}≡{x∈ S | a= x} (so that by logic a  U iC {a}⊆U
iC {a} GU ), )nite subsets by {a0; : : : ; an−1}≡{x∈ S | x= a0∨· · ·∨x= an−1} whenever
a0; : : : ; an−1 ∈ S (keeping in mind that several intuitionistically non equivalent notions
are reasonable), etc.; I refer to [39] for details on these and other tools, like quanti)ers
relative to a subset, subset-indexed family of subsets, etc.
Other tools are still to be tuned up and tested. Note that this is not a routine task.
We know for instance that requiring some among the common properties of powersets
and of quotient sets, or that the subsets of a set, or even the )nite ones, form a set,
would bring us to classical logic (see [24,23]); this would mean destroying all the
eCorts of preserving constructivity. To develop formal topology such properties are not
essential; for instance, quanti)cation over )nite subsets of a set (or of a subset) is
reduced to quanti)cation over a set of lists.
1.3.2. Predicative completeness proofs
An important insight about intuitionistic logic, which goes back to the 1930s, is that
its propositions (or formulae) can be interpreted mathematically as the open subsets of
a topological space. As shown in [33], also formal topology provides with a complete
semantics, by interpreting formulae as formal open subsets (and by suppressing the
predicate Pos). Since the notion of formal topology is fully predicative, the result is
a proof of completeness of topological semantics which is also fully predicative. As
in the original proof by Henkin, the key step is the construction of a generic model
from the syntax itself; in our case, a suitable cover on the set of formulae must be
introduced. Two such covers are studied in detail in [9], where it is shown that formal
points over one of them are exactly the same thing as Henkin sets. This gives a precise
form to the idea that points correspond to models [16]; for some other comments and
references, see the introduction of [9].
The completeness proof in [33] is actually given in a modular way for a variety of
logics, which all are extensions of intuitionistic linear logic. To this aim, the notion
of cover is generalized to that of precover, in which the two assumptions on ·, namely
·-Left and ·-Right, are replaced by the single one:
stability
a✁ U b✁ V
a · b✁ U · V :
or its equivalent
localization
a✁ U
a · b✁ U · b where U · b ≡ U · {b}:
A pretopology is a commutative monoid equipped with a precover. A cover be-
comes exactly the same as a precover satisfying the conditions corresponding to the
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structural rules of weakening and contraction, which can be seen to be a · b✁ a and
a✁ a · a, respectively (or some other equivalents). On the other hand, pretopologies
in which the double negation law is valid turn out to coincide literally with phase
spaces, that is the semantics of linear logic given by Jean-Yves Girard
in [20].
1.3.3. Predicative presentation of frames
An in)nitary relation ✁ satisfying only the properties of reHexivity and transitivity,
as in the de)nition of covers, is called an in)nitary preorder. It was discovered long
ago (see [32]) that in)nitary preorders on a set S correspond biunivocally to closure
operators on S (that is, functions C :PS→PS such that U ⊆CU , U ⊆V →CU ⊆CV
and CCU ⊆CU ). In fact, by setting AU ≡{a∈ S : a✁U} one has that a✁U is
the same as a AU , so that reHexivity can be rewritten as U ⊆AU and transitivity
as V ⊆AU→AV ⊆AU ; one can then easily check that these two conditions on
A are equivalent to those in the de)nition of closure operator. Moreover, it is well
known that closure operators correspond to complete lattices (given a closure operator
A, the collection of saturated subsets Sat(A)≡{U ⊆ S: U =AU} is a complete
lattice, in which meet is given by intersection and join by the saturation of union,
and conversely, given a complete lattice, putting a AU ≡ a6∨U gives a closure
operator).
Building on these remarks, one can obtain a modular presentation of sup-lattices
(that is, lattices with arbitrary joins—and hence also meets—but in which only joins
are preserved by morphisms), quantales and frames by generators and relations. The
sup-lattice freely generated by a set S of generators is just PS. So the idea is to
describe the ordering of any sup-lattice generated by S by adding conditions, or ax-
ioms R(a; U ), to be satis)ed if a6
∨
b  U b. The main result (which generalizes a
similar result in [21]) is that the least in)nitary preorder ✁R containing R gives
exactly the free sup-lattice satisfying the axioms given by R. The same result for
quantales and frames is obtained in a modular way, by adding suitable extra
conditions.
This line of research was begun very early, see [2], and several earlier versions of
the )nal paper [3] circulated privately. In fact, it took a long time to understand prop-
erly how it is possible to generate ✁R above in a predicative way, and for which R
this is possible (see [10]). One must be very careful here: when one says that formal
topologies (without Pos) form a category which is equivalent to that of frames, one
must realize that the proof cannot be predicative, unless one previously restricts to
a predicative de)nition of frames. The point here is that a predicative notion of
frame: : : is nothing but the notion of formal topology.
1.3.4. Domain theory as a branch of formal topology
For any formal topology S, the collection of its formal points Pt(S) (see Section
2.4 for a de)nition) is said to be a formal space. This is a genetic characterization
of formal spaces. In general, an axiomatic de)nition is not available; one can only
de)ne as usual the specialization ordering on formal points , ( by setting 6(≡ (⊆ 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( is less than ( if it is more informative, i.e. contains more elements of S) and observe
that Pt(S) thus becomes a complete partial order. But if we restrict our attention to
the class of unary formal topologies, which are those in which the cover is unary, or
1-compact,
a✁ U iC Pos(a) → (∃b  U )(a✁ {b});
(It is understood that this equivalence can hold constructively only if we have a function
F(a; U )  U (a ∈ S; U ⊆ S) such that a✁F(a; u) whenever a✁U (see the discussion
at the end of Section 1.2).) then the associated class of formal spaces admits of an
axiomatization, and actually a well-known one, since it turns out to be exactly the class
of Scott domains (the link with Scott domains was present from the beginning, see [32],
Section 7, but it was spelled out only later in [40]). In fact, a unary cover is intuitively
one in which no two neighbourhoods do cooperate to produce coverings. So one can
see that in any unary S all subsets of the form ↑ a≡{b : a✁ b}, for any positive a,
are formal points of S, and all formal points are obtained by forming unions of these.
In other words, positive elements of S correspond to compact elements of the Scott
domain Pt(S). Then one can read both Scott’s de)nition of information systems [41]
and the even simpler de)nition of information bases in [40] either as an axiomatization
of the structure of compact elements of a domain or as a simpli)ed characterization of
unary formal topologies. This is to say that the category of unary formal topologies,
that of information systems, and that of information bases are mutually equivalent,
and Scott domains are obtained by applying the functor Pt bringing to formal spaces.
So the de)nitions of domain theory become special cases of notions having a general
topological meaning, and in the end this has produced a simpli)ed approach to the
theory of domains, which moreover is fully predicative. For instance, it has been proved
predicatively, by Valentini [47], that the category of information bases is cartesian
closed.
The connection between formal topology and domain theory is clear also in the
approach to formal topology via the basic picture, which is described in Section 2
below. A curious fact is that, while the categories of (arbitrary) formal topologies,
in the old and in the new sense, are equivalent, this is no longer true for unary
formal topologies. So unary formal topologies, in the new sense, are equivalent to
algebraic domains, and the extra condition characterizing Pt(S) as a Scott domain is
not independent of the way S is given (see [34]). The next natural step is to extend
the connection with domain theory by )nding predicative de)nitions of the way-below
relation and of continuous domains; a common expectation is that the right idea should
be that of bases with the interpolation property (see [1]).
A nice topic for research is to reveal which of the results for unary formal topologies
extend to the case of )nitary (or Stone) formal topologies, that is those in which the
cover satis)es
a✁ U iC there is a )nite subset K of U such that a✁ K:
(Here too one understands the presence of a function F(a; U ) such that F(a; U ) is a
)nite subset of U and a ✁ U → a ✁ F(a; U ):) In particular, it is still unknown to
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me whether it is possible to )nd an axiomatization of formal spaces corresponding to
)nitary formal topologies.
Also quantitative domain theory can be dealt with predicatively. Curi has shown
in [11,12] that the notion of cpo’s with weight and distance of [49] can be generalized
to the notion of a formal topology with weight and distance.
1.3.5. Inductive generation of formal topologies and proof-theoretic methods
A formal topology, one could say, is just a way to present a frame (the frame
Sat(A)) by generators (the set S) and relations (the cover ✁, or equivalently the
closure operator A). The choices taken when de)ning formal topologies are actually
linked with the choice for predicative methods. But whatever the reason is, the intro-
duction of formal topologies has opened the way to the use of inductive methods in
topology. Actually, all the axioms or conditions are preferably written in the form of
inference rules exactly for the purpose of applying proof-theoretic methods or ideas.
This appears as a conceptual novelty in the )eld of topology, and gives to formal
topology its distinctive character: formal topology, which happened to begin as a the-
ory of locales developed over a diCerent foundation (namely, type theory rather than
topos theory), has later developed a speci)c identity also from a strictly mathematical
point of view. One typical result in this sense is the normal form theorem for covers
on real numbers, and the problem it leads to (see Section 1.3.6 below). Another one
is that the )nitary content of a formal cover generated by axioms  is just the cover
generated by the )nitary part of , that is, by those axioms of  in which only )nite
subsets are involved.
The importance of the inductive generation of formal topologies is clear, for a pred-
icative approach, when one observes that, for instance, the product of two
formal topologies cannot be de)ned predicatively, unless they are inductively generated
(see [10]). This has raised the question whether one should restrict one’s attention and
add the requirement of inductive generation to the de)nition of formal topology itself;
this is discussed in Section 2.6.
Any other information about the inductive generation of formal topologies can be
found in [10]; in particular, the readers will discover there that allmost all the examples
of formal topologies which can be found “in nature” do fall under the scope of the
theorem on inductive generation. This gives a solid argument in favour of formal
topology, since it automatically means that all those examples can be formalized into
a computer language.
1.3.6. The continuum as a formal space
In [32] it was suggested that the continuum could be presented via formal topology
essentially as in [21]. This idea was later worked out by my student Daniele Soravia
in [45], where also the beginning of real analysis is developed (all this appeared
subsequently in [28]). The main idea is that a real number is a formal point on a
suitable formal topology where basic neighbourhoods are pairs of rational numbers,
(p; q) with p; q∈Q. The positivity predicate is de)ned by Pos((p; q))≡p¡q, and
the cover ✁ is de)ned inductively by the following rules (which are a formulation in
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our context of Joyal axioms, cf. [21, pp. 123–124]):
q6 p
(p; q)✁ U
;
(p; q) ∈ U
(p; q)✁ U
;
p′ 6 p ¡ q6 q′ (p′; q′)✁ U
(p; q)✁ U
;
p6 r ¡ s6 q (p; s)✁ U (r; q)✁ U
(p; q)✁ U
;
∞ wc((p; q))✁ U
(p; q)✁ U
;
where in the last axiom we have used the abbreviation wc((p; q))≡{(p′; q′):p¡p′;
q′¡q}. (where wc stands for ‘well-covered’). This presentation of the cover is essen-
tially due to Coquand. The formal reals are just the formal points of such a formal
topology.
We have then the following normal form theorem, by which the ‘in)nitary’ rule ∞
is isolated:
Theorem of canonical form. Any derivation of a statement a✁U can be brought
to a form where the only application of the rule ∞ is the last one, just above the
conclusion.
In this way the )nitary part of the cover is distinguished from its in)nitary compo-
nent, and the logical tool we make use of is limited to a 7nitary inductive de)nition.
The proof is by induction on the derivation of a✁U , as standard in proof theory.
If ✁! is the ()nitary) compacti)cation of ✁, which by the remarks in the previous
section coincides with the cover generated by the rules above except ∞, this amounts
to have proved that
(p; q)✁ U if and only if wc((p; q))✁! U;
providing thus a de)nition of (p; q)✁U as wc((p; q)) ✁! U , that is an elementary
de)nition over a )nitary inductive de)nition.
I express here the expectation that a similar (proof-theoretic) procedure can be used
to separate the in)nitary content of a cover from its )nite part for a wider class of
topologies (which presumably should be compact in some sense; cf. for instance [6]).
This is still an open problem.
The above notion of well-covered elements can be generalized to an arbitrary formal
topology, by setting
wc(a) ≡ {b: S ✁ b∗ ∪ {a}};
where b∗≡{c: c ↓ b✁ ∅} is the subset of neighbourhoods which are apart from b.
Then b  wc(a) is classically equivalent to saying that ext(b) is well covered by ext(a)
if the closure of ext(b) is contained in ext(a). This brings us to de)ne regular formal
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topologies as those topologies in which a✁wc(a) for any a. It can be shown that such
de)nition has some of the properties one would expect. For instance, one can prove
that for any two formal points  and (, if ⊆ ( then = (, that is, the ordering on
formal points is discrete (a paper with Curi is in preparation; see also [13]).
1.3.7. Classical theorems constructivized
A natural and reasonable question is of course how many of the classical theorems of
(classical) topology can be obtained in the framework of formal topology. I am )rmly
convinced that, as with any form of constructive mathematics, the fact that relatively
few results have been found up to now is not due to intrinsic obstacles, but mainly
to the relatively little research energy which has been put in )nding them.
Two important examples making explicit use of results of formal topology are
TychonoC ’s theorem [29] (building on previous work in [8]) and the Hahn-Banach
theorem [7]. In [14], by introducing elementary diameters, a predicative version of
Urysohn’s metrization theorem is obtained.
More generally, formal topology is one of the ingredients of a new phase in the con-
structivization of classical mathematics, which is visible in the recent work
by Coquand and others. Since no summary would do justice to this, I encourage
the readers to look directly at his papers.
2. Some points, some novelties: the approach via the basic picture
Though successful, the de)nition of formal topology, as given in [32] or in Sec-
tion 1.2, still leaves something to be desired. One desire is a convincing de)nition
of formal closed subsets. Another is to avoid the operation · of formal intersection,
which makes the treatment of some important examples, like PX and upper subsets
in a preorder, a bit arti)cial. A positive solution to both requests (see [34]) has come
from a deeper analysis of the notion of topological space. This has actually brought up
much more than that. In fact, a whole new ground structure has emerged, which I have
called the basic picture, since it shows how the main de)nitions of topology are deeply
rooted to very basic ingredients, such as symmetry and logical duality. Topology, ei-
ther with or without points, turns out to be obtainable simply by adding a principle
of additivity of approximations (expressed by B2, in Section 2.1, and by ↓-Right, in
Section 2.4), that is adding a notion of convergence. This in my opinion gives a very
satisfactory explanation of the ground concepts of topology, which is independent of
any foundational theory.
The basic picture has, moreover, a precise mathematical raison d’eˆtre, which has
recently started to become clear. In fact, it seems that it is characterizable as the
theory of what remains invariant under transfer along a continuous relation, in the
same sense as topology can be seen as the theory of invariance under transfer along a
continuous function.
I give here a short introduction to the ideas and to the main de)nitions of the basic
picture. Some of them )rst appeared in [38]. For a complete development, see the
series of papers in preparation [35,37,17–19], and other to follow. For some general
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observations connected with the basic picture, see Section 3, in particular Sections 3.1.4
and 3.2.
2.1. From concrete spaces to basic pairs
Let us resume our analysis of the notion of topological space, in Section 1.1, and
more precisely at the moment in which we assumed the base to be closed under
intersection. We now see that this is not necessary, and that actually relaxing that
assumption allows one to see a simpler and deeper structure.
So assume, as before, that X is a set (of points), S is a set of indexes, and ext is a
function from S into subsets of X . We consider all the subsets obtained by union, that
is, all subsets of X of the form ext(U )≡ ⋃a  U ext(a) for some U ⊆ S. Then we want
to )nd out under which conditions on ext the subsets ext(U ); U ⊆ S, form a topology,
that is, satisfy O1− O3.
To this end, it is convenient to adopt a notation better suited than ext, as we now
explain. Since a subset of X is nothing but a propositional function over X , a family of
subsets ext(a)⊆X (a∈ S) is nothing but a propositional function with two arguments,
one in X and one in S, in other words a binary relation between X and S (see
Section 1.3.1). Then it is better to write such a relation as
x  a prop (x ∈ X; a ∈ S)
and to de)ne ext in terms of it, by setting
ext(a) ≡ {x ∈ X : x  a} for any a ∈ S:
In this way the abstraction is kept at a lower level, both intuitively and formally (since
ext a is obtained from x a by abstraction on x). Elements of S are called formal basic
neighbourhoods, or more brieHy observables, and x a is read as “x lies in a”, or “x
satis)es a”, or more neutrally “x forces a”. The choice of the name ext should then
be clear: ext(a) is called the extension of the observable a. The notation with  is
extended to subsets by setting
x  U ≡ (∃b ∈ S)(x  b& b  U ) ≡ x  ⋃
b U
ext(b)
which agrees with the reading “x lies in U” since ext(U )≡ ⋃b U ext(b)≡{x : xU}.
It is easy to check, at any desired level of formal details (using the de)nitions of [39]
repeated in Section 1.3.1), that the family of subsets ext(U )⊆ S (U ⊆ S) is closed
under unions. By this we mean, of course, that for any family of subsets Ui⊆ S (i∈ I)
indexed by a set I , it holds that
⋃
i∈I ext(Ui) = ext(
⋃
i∈I Ui). In fact, x 
⋃
i∈I ext(Ui)≡
(∃i∈ I)(∃b  Ui)(x b) is equivalent to (∃b 
⋃
i∈I Ui)(x b)≡ x  ext(
⋃
i∈I Ui). So O3
is automatically satis)ed.
Condition O1 also is easily expressed. In fact, ∅= ext(∅) because a  ∅ holds for no
a, and X = ext(U ) for some U ⊆ S is equivalent to X = ext(S), that is
B1 x  S for any x ∈ X:
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We thus can concentrate on O2. If we express it without care, writing
(∀U; V ⊆ S)(∃W ⊆ S)(extU ∩ extV = extW );
again an impredicative quanti)cation comes up. However, this luckily is not really
necessary. The quanti)cation of the form ∀U; V∃W is solved if we )nd a uniform
method which associates a subset W satisfying extU ∩ extV = extW with any pair
of subsets U; V . The simplest such method is to pick the largest among the open
subsets contained in extU ∩ extV . That is, if extU ∩ extV is open, which means
that it is equal to extW for some W , then it is bound to be equal to extZ where
Z is formed by all c∈ S whose extension is contained in extU ∩ extV , in sym-
bols Z ≡{c∈ S: ext(c)⊆ extU ∩ extV}. So O2 is equivalent to extU ∩ extV = extZ .
However, we can do much better than this. If we apply the same idea to open subsets
of the form ext a with a∈ S, we obtain
B2 ext a ∩ ext b = ext (a ↓ b);
where a ↓ b≡{c∈ S: ext c⊆ ext a∩ ext b} is the largest subset whose extension is
contained in ext a∩ ext b. It is now easy to see, by the distributivity property of PX ,
that B2 is the right condition. In fact for any U; V ⊆ S we have
extU ∩ extV ≡
( ⋃
a  U
ext a
)
∩
( ⋃
b  V
ext b
)
by de)nition of ext on subsets;
=
⋃
a  U
⋃
b  V
(ext a ∩ ext b) by distributivity of PX;
=
⋃
a  U
⋃
b  V
ext (a ↓ b) by B2;
= ext
( ⋃
a  U
⋃
b  V
a ↓ b
)
because ext distributes over unions:
So we put
U ↓ V ≡ ⋃
a  U
⋃
b  V
a ↓ b:
If B2 holds, then also extU ∩ extV = ext (U ↓V ) holds, and hence O2 is satis)ed.
Note that now U ↓V is not necessarily the largest subset Z as de)ned above. But this
is irrelevant. In fact, if extU ∩ extV = ext (U ↓V ), then also extU ∩ extV = extZ
because ext (U ↓V )⊆ extZ ⊆ extU ∩ extV .
The reason for names B1 and B2 is that they are just a compound expression, in
our language, of the standard conditions for bases for a topology (see e.g. [15, p. 38]).
B1 is clear: it says that the whole X is open. The inclusion ext (a ↓ b)⊆ ext a∩ ext b
of B2 always holds, and the other can be written as
∀x(x  a&x  b→ (∃c)(x  c& ext (c) ⊆ ext (a) ∩ ext (b));
that is, for any point x lying in the basic neighbourhoods ext (a) and ext (b), there is
a neighbourhood ext (c) of x which is contained both in ext (a) and in ext (b).
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So we have proved that the collection of subsets extU ⊆X (U ⊆ S), where extU ≡⋃
a  U ext (a), is a topology on X , that is, it satis)es O1− O3, if and only if ext is a
base, that is, it satis)es B1 and B2 above.
We have thus reached a de)nition of concrete space (see Section 1.1) which is
free of the operation · of formal intersection, as we wished. To help the intuition, we
express B1 and B2 in the notation with .
Denition 3. A concrete space is a structure X= (X;; S) where
X is a set, whose elements x; y; z; : : : are called concrete points;
S is a set, whose elements a; b; c; : : : are called observables, or formal basic neigh-
bourhoods;
 is a binary relation from X to S, called forcing, which satis)es
B1 x  S for any x ∈ X;
B2
x  a x  b
x  a ↓ b for any a; b ∈ S and x ∈ X:
This brings us easily to a new formulation of the notion of formal topology, which
is obtained from De)nition 1 by suppressing ·, 1 and their axioms, and by replacing
them with the single condition (which expresses B2 in formal terms)
↓ -Right a✁ U a✁ V
a✁ U ↓ V ;
where U ↓V ≡{d: (∃b  U )(d✁ {b}) & (∃c  V )(d✁ {c})}. This variant on the de)ni-
tion (see also [42] for a similar approach) has been adopted in [10] since it allows a
smoother approach to the topic of inductive generation. Note also that now both PS
and the collection of upper subsets of a preordered set (S;6) fall easily and natu-
rally under the de)nition of formal topology. Moreover, it can be proved that for any
formal topology S with ↓ there is a formal topology S′ with · (as in Section 1.2)
such that S and S′ produce the same frame of formal open subsets. The condition
↓-Right is present also in the new de)nition of formal topology which will be given
in Section 2.4.
These are useful technical improvements. However, the most important consequence
of the analysis which led to De)nition 3 above is conceptual, rather than technical. At
an impredicative reading, the above de)nition of concrete space is just a cumbersome
formulation, but perfectly equivalent to the usual de)nition of topological space. Pred-
icatively, the notion of set is much stricter, and hence many examples of spaces do not
fall under De)nition 3 simply because the collection of points X is not a set: this is
a good reason to develop formal topology. Nevertheless, although keeping this crucial
remark in mind, one can see that the framework provided by De)nition 3 is suMcient
to de)ne the notions of open and closed subset in a way which is perfectly acceptable
also constructively. In fact, as we will see, the way to dispense with the powerset ax-
iom and second-order quanti)cations is to reduce systematically to quanti)cations over
basic neighbourhoods, that is over the set S. Thus the set S is an essential ingredient of
the de)nition, and it should not be forgotten (in the sense of Section 3.1.3), contrary
to the common approach which tends to avoid any reference to bases.
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The usual de)nition can be rephrased by saying that a subset E⊆X is open if:
whenever x  E, then this is true in a continuous way, that is not only x, but also a
whole neighbourhood of x is contained in E. In our notation this becomes
x  E → (∃a ∈ S)(x  a& ext a ⊆ E):
We put as usual int E≡{x∈X : (∃a∈ S)(x a& ext a⊆E)}. Such operator int, for
interior, can be thought of intuitively as a rejector, or thinner, which makes E as thin
as possible, that is, which throws away from E all isolated points, but is unable to
throw away from E a whole neighbourhood ext a. So E is open if E⊆ int E, which
is equivalent to saying that the rejector operator has no eCect on E.
The de)nition of closed subset can be put in perfectly dual terms. In fact, the usual
de)nition can be expressed by saying that D⊆X is closed if whenever it is continuously
satis)able for x to be in D, then actually x  D. I here say that x  D is continuously
satis)able if any neighbourhood of x touches D. We now can see that the notion of
meet G begins to be useful. In fact, the above intuitive de)nition is formally expressed
by
(∀a ∈ S)(x  a→ ext a G D) → x  D:
The subset clD≡{x: (∀a∈ S)(x a→ ext a GD)} is the closure of D, and one can
intuitively think of cl as an attractor, or fattener operator: it adds to D all points
x which “continuously touch” D, in the sense that any neighbourhood of x meets
D. Note that this is a positive way of aMrming that x cannot be continuously sepa-
rated from D, which would be ¬∃a(x a& ext(a)∩D= ∅) and which is equivalent to
∀a(x a→ ext(a) GD) only classically. So D is closed if the attractor operator cl has
no eCect on D, that is, D is already as big as it is consistent to be.
The notation we adopted, together with explicit expression of the logical formalism
involved, allows one to see immediately the strong logical relation between interior and
closure. The de)nition of closure is logically dual to that of interior, in the sense that ∃
is replaced by ∀, & is replaced by → (which in type theory are special cases of ∃ and
∀, respectively) and ⊆ is replaced by G (whose de)nitions are in turn obtained one from
the other by interchanging ∀ with ∃). We want to keep this duality, and actually build
on it and make it clearer. Adopting classical logic here would immediately reduce it
to the much simpler duality between a subset and its complement. In fact, by classical
logic we would have: D closed ≡ (∀a∈ S)(x a→ ext a GD)→ x  D if and only if
¬(∃a∈ S)(x a&¬(ext a GD))→ x  D if and only if x−D→ (∃a∈ S)(x a& ext a⊆
−D)≡−D open.
So, in the same way as classical logic reduces the meaning of existential quanti)ca-
tion to a negation of a universal quanti)cation, here it would reduce the de)nition of
closed subset, which in the essence is a quanti)cation of the form ∀∃, to that of open
subset, which is of the form ∃∀.
An obvious remark, which however is of crucial importance for what follows, is
that the conditions B1 and B2 have no role in the de)nitions of open and of closed
subsets. Then it is worthwile to analyse the logical duality between closure and interior
in the more general structure given simply by two sets X , S and any binary relation
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 between them. I call it a basic pair. Moreover, the simple remark that the notion of
basic pair is perfectly self-symmetric, will lead to the discovery of the role of symmetry
in topology.
2.2. A structure for topology
From now on, we keep the sets X and S always )xed, also in the sense that we
think of X as situated at the left, and of S as situated at the right as in Picture 1
below.
Picture 1
We systematically use x; y; : : : for elements and D; E; : : : for subsets of X , a; b; : : : for
elements and U; V; : : : for subsets of S. In this way we can avoid to mention the
domain of quanti)cations, and we shall do so from now on. One can think intuitively
of x; y; : : : as points and of a; b; : : : as observables (cf. [43]), so that x a means that
the observable a applies to the point x.
The relation x a is expressed at the left by the synonym x  ext a, where ext
a≡{x : x a} is the extension of a, and at the right by the synonym a ✸x, where
✸x≡{a : xa}. The relation  induces four monotone operators on subsets; in the
language of categories, these are just functors from PX into PS or conversely, when
both PX and PS are seen as preordered categories. First we de)ne the functors ext
and rest from PS into PX by setting:
x ext(U )≡✸x GU ,
x rest(U )≡✸x⊆U .
These are, respectively, just the de)nitions of weak, or existential, and of strong, or
universal, anti-image of the subset U along the relation . The name rest is due to
the idea of conceiving rest U as the restriction to those points of X which live in
U , in the sense that all their observables belong to U . If the relation from X to S is
denoted more simply by R, or even better by a small r (because we will think of it
also as a function from X into PS, and not only as a binary propositional function), a
good notation is r− for the weak, and r∗ for the strong anti-image. That is, using the
notation rx≡{a : xra} for the r-image of x (which is ✸x when r is denoted by ),
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we put
x  r−(U )≡ rx GU ,
x  r∗(U )≡ rx⊆U .
An important little observation, which will often be used tacitly, is that the existential
anti-image is just the union of anti-images of elements, that is ext(U )≡ ∪b U ext b;
note also that this gives in particular ext({b}) = ext b, and this is why we can use the
same letter ext without confusion both for the operator on elements and for that on
subsets. Note also that r− and r∗ coincide when r is the graph of a function, because
rx GU if and only if rx⊆U when rx is a singleton.
The same de)nitions apply also to the inverse relations. So we have two functors
✸ and from PX into PS which are de)ned by 10
a ✸D≡ ext a GD,
a  D≡ ext a⊆D.
Note that, as for ext, ✸({b}) =✸b. In the abstract notation with r, we write r− for
the relation which is inverse of r, that is, which is de)ned by ar−x≡ xra and also
extend to r− the notation for images of elements, so that r−a≡{x : xra}; this notation
is justi)ed since the r−-image of the element a coincides with the weak anti-image of
the singleton subset {a} along r as de)ned before, that is r−a= r−{a}. Then we can
put:
a  rD≡ r−a GD,
a  r−∗D≡ r−a⊆D.
Note that the weak anti-image of U along r, as de)ned before, coincides with the
(direct) image of U along the inverse relation r−, and so both are denoted by r−U .
As before for ext and r−, one can see also that r{x}= rx and that rD= ∪x  D rx.
The starting point of the basic picture is the discovery that the operators int and cl
as de)ned in the preceding section are nothing but the composition of the operators
just de)ned:
int ≡ ext and cl ≡ rest ✸:
In fact, one can easily see that x  int D≡∃a(x a& ext a⊆D)≡✸x G D and that
x  cl D≡∀a(x a→ ext a GD)≡✸x⊆✸D. So one can see that the duality between
int and cl is the result of a deeper duality between ✸ and , and between ext and
rest.
This is a good point to repeat that the structure consisting of X ,  and S is absolutely
symmetric. Maybe it takes some eCort to abandon the intuition of X as points and of S
as observables, but the plain mathematical content is only that they are two sets linked
10 Clearly, the signs ✸ and are taken from modal logic; if S =X and  is the accessibility relation,
then ✸D and D are the valuations of formulae ✸/ and /, respectively, if D is the valuation of /. The
operators ext and rest then correspond to possibility and necessity in the past, respectively, as in temporal
logic.
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by an arbitrary relation. So, in a fully symmetric way we can de)ne two operators on
PS, which are symmetric of int and of cl, respectively:
J ≡ ✸ rest and A ≡ ext:
In fact, they are obtained by replacing ext, , rest, ✸ with their symmetric ✸, rest,
, ext, respectively. The meaning of such operators 11 becomes clearer by making
de)nitions explicit. Since a AU ≡ ext a⊆ ext U ≡∀x(x a→ xU ), then a AU
means that all points lying in a also lie in U . So, a AU is something we know
already, since it expresses the intuition of the formal cover a / U , as in Section 1.1.
Let us turn to a JU ≡ ext a G rest(U ). The explicit de)nition is ∃x(x a&✸x⊆U ),
which means that a is inhabited by some point, about which we know in addition that
all its neighbourhoods are in U . Informally, a JU says that there is a point in ext a,
and U gives positive information on where inside ext a it is. In the special case U = S,
a JS means simply that ext a is inhabited; we met this in Section 1.1 as the intuitive
explanation of the predicate Pos. So a JU is the pointwise de)nition of a new formal
relation between an element a and a subset U of S; we denote it by Pos(a; U ), or also
by aU , and call it a binary positivity predicate. As it is evident from the preceding
explanation, the idea of introducing J or  is quite natural by structural reasons:
symmetry, since J is symmetric to int, and logical duality, since J is dual to A.
Whatever is the way to reach it, however, it gives a new possible choice of primitive
relation on S, namely , to be added to /. So following the method in Section 1.1
one is lead to a new de)nition of formal topology, with a binary positivity predicate,
see Section 2.4. This is one of the main conceptual novelties of the present approach.
Also, since A and J can be de)ned on any basic pair, one can apply the same method
on an arbitrary basic pair and obtain a weaker notion than that of formal topology,
see Section 2.4. This is another important conceptual novelty. Some comments will be
given after the mathematical development.
Since the operators are de)ned in terms of a relation, through existential and universal
quanti)cations, it follows that there is an adjunction between each existential operator
and the universal operator in the opposite direction. So ext is left adjoint of and ✸
is left adjoint of rest:
ext that is ext U ⊆D if and only if U ⊆ D, for any D;U ,
✸ rest that is ✸D⊆U if and only if D⊆ rest U , for any D;U .
A formal proof is based on the equivalence between ∃xAx→B and ∀x(Ax→B), in
intuitionistic logic. In the notation with r, these are just the adjunctions:
r−  r−∗ that is r−U ⊆D if and only if U ⊆ r−∗D, for any D;U ,
r  r∗ that is rD⊆U if and only if D⊆ r∗U , for any D;U ,
11 The choice of the letter J is due to the fact that I had no other available, and it should not be connected
with the so called j-operators of locale theory, see [21].
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respectively. I call these the two fundamental adjunctions determined by the
relation r.
It is a general well known fact that the composition of the left adjoint (existential)
after the right adjoint (universal) operator gives an interior operator. So J≡✸rest
is an interior operator; this means that J satis)es JU ⊆U , U ⊆V →JU ⊆JV
and JU ⊆JJU , or equivalently JU ⊆U and JU ⊆V →JU ⊆JV . By symme-
try, int≡ ext also is an interior operator. Note that i: int is proved to be an interior
operator on any basic pair (thus also when B1 and B2 are not assumed) and hence ii:
int does not in general preserve )nite intersections (one can prove that this is actually
equivalent to B2), that is, it is not what is sometimes called a topological interior
operator (see e.g. [43]).
Similarly, the composition of after ext, namely A, and of rest after ✸, namely cl,
are closure operators. This means that U ⊆AU , U ⊆V →AU ⊆AV and AAU ⊆
AU hold, or equivalently U ⊆AU and U ⊆AV →AU ⊆AV . Similarly for cl; of
course, two remarks analogous to those on int apply to cl.
For a closure operator, such as A, we say that a subset U ⊆ S is A-saturated if
U =AU . So D⊆X is cl-saturated if D= cl D, that is when D is closed. We denote
by Sat(A), and Sat(cl), the collection of saturated subsets.
Similarly, for an interior operator, such as J, we say that a subset U ⊆ S is
J-reduced if U =JU . So D⊆X is int-reduced if D= int D, that is when D is
open. The collections of reduced subsets are denoted by Red(J) and Red(int).
For any operator C, either a closure or an interior operator, one can de)ne suprema
and in)ma by putting
∨
i∈I
CUi ≡ C
(⋃
i∈I
CUi
)
and
∧
i∈I
CUi ≡ C
(⋂
i∈I
CUi
)
:
So Sat(A), Sat(cl), Red(J) and Red(int) are all complete lattices. It is not diMcult
to prove (by making systematic use of the two fundamental adjunctions) that actually
Red(int) is isomorphic to Sat(A), via the isomorphism : Red(int)→ Sat(A) with
inverse ext: Red(int) ← Sat(A). This is why A-saturated subsets are called formal
open, and int-reduced subsets, viz. open subsets of X , are called concrete open when
there is danger of confusion.
The isomorphism between formal open and concrete open subsets was somehow
expected, see the ideas in Section 1.1. What came as a surprise is the fact that to be
able to obtain a similar isomorphism for concrete closed subsets one has to introduce
a new primitive, namely J or , and de)ne a subset of S to be formal closed if
it is J-reduced.
Picture 2 sums up the situation. Note that in the top line we have two closure
operators, which are of the form ∀∃, while in the bottom line we have two interior
operators, of the form ∃∀. The choice of names is due to the fact that we want the
two lattices of (concrete and formal) open subsets, and equally for closed subsets, to
be isomorphic. This has the consequence that formal open subsets are described by a
closure operator and formal closed subsets by an interior operator.
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This concludes the )rst chapter of the basic picture (a full exposition is in [35]). We
are now going to see that similar structural characterizations can be obtained also for
other notions of topology.
Picture 2
2.3. The essence of continuity
A common de)nition says that a function f : X →Y is continuous if, for any x∈X ,
whatever neighbourhood E of fx one considers, there is a whole neighbourhood D of
x which is all sent “close” to fx, that is inside E. In our framework, assume X and
Y are the sets of points of two basic pairs or concrete spaces X 1→ S and Y 2→T (we
will omit subscripts unless strictly necessary). Then the de)nition of continuity for f
is formally expressed by
∀b(f x  b→ ∃a(x  a & ∀z(z  a→ f z  b)): (1)
As it is well known, f is continuous if and only if the inverse-images along f of
open subsets of Y are open in X . In our framework, this means that for each b∈T ,
f−ext b= ext({a∈ S : ext a⊆f− ext b}). If we de)ne a relation s : S→T by putting
a s b≡ ext a⊆f− ext b, this equation means that f− ◦2− =1− ◦ s−. But then,
to restore symmetry, one is lead to generalize the treatment to a relation r also from X
to Y . This move is of crucial importance, since it allows to make the structure under-
lying continuity more clearly visible, and simpler, than with functions.
Let us )rst )nd a suitable extension of (1) to relations. First, rewrite (1) as ∀b(fx 
ext b→∃a (x  ext a& ext a⊆f− ext b)). At this point, recall that fx is an element,
while r x is a subset of Y . So we can think of f x  ext b as {fx}⊆ ext b or as
{fx} G ext b; the second choice works better. So we say that r : X →Y is continuous if
rx G ext b→ ∃a(x  ext a&ext a⊆ r− ext b) (2)
holds for any x∈X , b∈T .
An important discovery is the equivalence of the following conditions:
(a) r is continuous,
(b) r− is open, that is r−ext b is open in X for any b∈T ,
(c) there exists s: S→T such that r x G ext b↔ ✸x G s−b, for any x∈X , b∈T .
G. Sambin / Theoretical Computer Science 305 (2003) 347–408 373
Note that the equivalence in c. is nothing but a way to express that  ◦ r = s ◦ , that
is commutativity of the diagram
So we de)ne a morphism from X → S to Y →T to be a pair of relations r : X →Y
and s : S→T which make the diagram commute. (r; s) is called a relation-pair.
The presence of s in the de)nition has the purpose of keeping the information which
otherwise is restored only by a quanti)cation over relations, as in (c)
above.
Commutativity of a diagram is the clearest structural description one can )nd. The
framework of basic pairs shows that the essence of continuity is just a commutative
square. In the case of functions, we obtain the usual de)nition as a special case.
Several other equivalent formulations of continuity are possible. Since commutativity
of the diagram is equivalently expressed by r− ◦ − = − ◦ s− and r∗ ◦ ∗ = ∗
◦ s∗, the notion of relation-pair is equivalently presented by each of the
equations
r− ext V = ext s−V for any V ⊆ T;
r∗ rest V = rest s∗V for any V ⊆ T:
The )rst says that r− is open, and s− is a method by which we determine the open
subsets of X which are the existential anti-images of open subsets of Y along r. The
second says that r∗ is closed, and s∗ gives a method by which we determine the closed
subsets of X which are universal anti-images of closed subsets of Y along r. In other
words, s gives the method by which we know that r− is open and r∗ is closed. Even
if, given r, one can de)ne a relation s such that (r; s) is a relation-pair by putting
asb≡ ext a⊆ r−ext b, to “forget” s thinking that it can always be restored is not
safe. For instance, only keeping the information s, some of the common equivalent
characterizations of continuity, like r− is open if and only if r∗ is closed, can be
proved constructively. If s is lost, by knowing that r∗ is closed there is no way, not
even impredicatively, neither to restore s, nor to prove that r− is open; in fact, two
)nite counterexamples in [18] show that the two conditions are no longer equivalent
when the formal side is forgotten.
The category BP with basic pairs as objects and relation-pairs as arrows diCers
from the well-known category Rel2, of relations and commutative square diagrams,
only in the fact that equality between relation-pairs is explicitly de)ned. Two relation-
pairs (r; s) and (r′; s′) are declared to be equal if they behave in the same way with
respect to open and to closed subsets, both concrete and formal. This too turns out
to be equivalent to a fully structural condition, namely that their top-left bottom-right
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diagonals coincide,
that is 2 ◦ r = 2 ◦ r′ = s ◦ 1 = s′ ◦ 1. The category BP is also diCerent from
the category of boolean Chu spaces (see [31]), since morphisms of Chu spaces are
functions (one in the reverse direction of the other).
Finally, the intrinsic symmetry of basic pairs and of relation-pairs is formally
expressed by the fact that the functor ( )−, de)ned by (X;; S)−≡ (S;−; X ) and
by (r; s)−≡ (s−; r−), is a self-duality of BP.
I refer the readers to [17] for a detailed exposition of the content of this section,
with complete proofs.
2.4. Basic topologies, formal topologies, formal spaces
The methodology to obtain the de)nition of a formal notion is always the same, and
it has been described in Section 1.1 (see also Section 3.2.2). The diCerence is that now
for this task we can make use of the preceding analysis of the structure induced on
a basic pair, and hence also on a concrete space. So on one hand it is easier, and on
the other hand it produces a richer structure. First we introduce a new notion, namely
that of (formal) basic topology, which is obtained by describing the structure induced
on the formal side of a basic pair, and by taking the result as an axiomatic de)nition.
The new de)nition of formal topology is then obtained simply by adding a formal
condition expressing that the basic pair is actually a concrete space. Finally, the notion
of formal point is obtained as an axiomatic description of the subset ✸x determined
by a concrete point x on the formal side.
There are a few good reasons to do all this, that is, to study formal topology: the
)rst is that it is a natural way, and often the only one, to be able to deal predicatively
with certain spaces. After all, this is just how the real numbers are obtained from the
topology of rational intervals. The second reason is that it provides more general tools
to topology (see Section 3.2.2). A third good reason to do it is simply that it can be
done, and that nice new structures emerge in this way. Thus it contributes to expand
the territory of mathematical thought (see Section 3.1.4).
In this section the de)nitions I propose will be introduced and shortly justi)ed.
The problem of the correctness of such de)nitions will be discussed in Section 2.6
in detail.
We have already seen that any basic pair X → S induces a closure operatorA≡ ext
and an interior operator J≡✸rest on the formal side, namely on the set S. This is
all we can say given that ext is left adjoint to , and that ✸ is left adjoint to rest,
respectively. What we have to add now is a condition linking A with J and
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expressing the fact that the two adjunctions ext and ✸ rest are induced by the
same relation . For any a∈ S and U; V ⊆ S, the rule
ext a G rest V ext a ⊆ ext U
ext U G rest V
clearly holds. Since ext a G rest V ≡ a JV , ext a⊆ ext U ≡ a AU and ext U G rest V
iC ∃b(b  U & b JV ), it says that a AU and aJV imply U GJV . Since the ele-
ment a does not appear in the conclusion, the conclusion is valid simply if such an
element exists. So we have the rule
compatibility
AU G JV
U G JV
:
Thus the )rst de)nition is simply that a formal basic topology is a triple S= (S;A;J)
where S is a set, A is a closure operator, J is an interior operator, and they are linked
by compatibility (note that compatibility is the same as the equivalence AU GJV ↔
U GJV , since the direction ← holds trivially). In the notation with a / U for a AU
and aV for a JV , this amounts to:
reHexivity
a  V
a / V
; transitivity
a / U U / V
a / V
;
co -reHexivity
aV
a  V
; co-transitivity
aU (∀b)(bU → b  V )
aV ;
compatibility
aV a / U
U V ;
where we now add the shorthand U V for (∃b  U )(bV ). It is just natural to carry
over the terminology from basic pairs and say that U is formal closed if U =JU and
formal open if U =AU .
The intuitive meaning of compatibility is that any formal closed subset V =JV
must split any cover, in the sense that if a / U and if a  V , then V must proceed
and meet U . This is nothing but the symmetric of the usual condition de)ning the
concrete closure. To see this, )rst note that, if we apply the same methodology to
the concrete side, since a basic pair is fully symmetric we obtain a fully symmetric
de)nition: a concrete basic topology is a triple (X; int; cl) where X is a set, int is an
interior operator, cl is a closure operator, and they are linked by
cl D G int E ↔ D G int E:
This equivalence is nothing but the characterization of closure in terms of all open
subsets, rather than subbasic neighbourhoods (as in Section 2.1).
The structure of a concrete basic topology is, from a purely mathematical point of
view, just identical with that of a formal basic topology, and thus one could call each
of them just a basic topology. But note that terminology is quite diCerent, since a
concrete open in (X; int; cl) is kept )xed by the interior operator int, while a formal
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open in (S;A;J) is kept )xed by the closure operator A. This is what the adjective
“concrete” or “formal” in front of “basic topology” recalls.
The de)nition of (concrete) basic topology is very simple, and should )nd its place
together with other de)nitions weaker than that of topological space which were given
long ago by Kuratowski, Frechet, WCech, and others. Its peculiarity is that it has a purely
structural justi)cation, and that it is meaningful only by assuming intuitionistic logic
and a primitive notion of closed subset (see Section 2.6).
The fact that the de)nition of basic topology is not too weak is con)rmed by some
initial results on the structure of possible combinations of the operators int, cl and
opposite −. First, one can easily prove that the diCerent combinations of int and cl are
exactly seven, and that the mutual inclusions are only 12 those shown in the picture
(in which inclusion appears as an edge upwards):
Adding the equation cl=−int− and classical logic, one can then easily obtain the well
known result by Kuratowski telling that there are at most 14 diCerent combinations of
−, int and cl.
In the general case, from compatibility one can obtain that cl D∩ int E = ∅ ↔
D∩ int E = ∅, and using this one can derive that the equations linking −, int and cl
are:
cl− D ⊆ −int D = cl− int D
int− cl D = int− D ⊆ −clD
(the proofs were )rst given in [44]). It is easy to )nd out that the inclusions −int D⊆
cl − D and −cl D⊆ int − D do not hold in general. The above equations seem to
express the basic properties of closure, interior and opposite in the intuitionistic case.
However, it is still not known (to me) whether other inclusions or equations involving
more occurrences of −, int and cl hold. An initial study in [44] has shown that all
the diCerent combinations with only one occurrence of − do not exceed the num-
ber of 22, and I still don’t know whether it is lower than that. With two occur-
rences of—, the number seems to get much higher. In general, it is apparently still
an open problem even to decide whether the total number of combinations is )nite or
in)nite.
It must be emphasized that all de)nitions and results so far have been obtained
starting from an arbitrary basic pair. It is now a relatively easy matter to )nd a
12 The method to )nd counterexamples for the other inclusions is interesting: one can choose a suitable
basic pair, and use the logical expressions for int and cl to show that they would give some implications
which are not valid intuitionistically.
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formal condition corresponding to the property we called B2, that is ext U ∩ ext V =
ext(U ↓ V ). In fact, if we express it in the equivalent form ∀x(xU & xV → xU ↓
V ) we see that, by replacing an arbitrary concrete point x with an arbitrary observable
a and the relation  with the cover /, we obtain ∀a(a / U & a / V → a / U ↓ V ). This
is the same as the rule
↓ -Right a / U a / V
a / U ↓ V :
Note that the formal expression of ext b∩ ext c= ext(b ↓ c), which by distributivity
is equivalent to ext U ∩ ext V = ext(U ↓ V ), would bring to a / b& a / c→ a / b ↓ c,
which is trivial since a / b& a / c gives a  b ↓ c by de)nition. In fact, the purpose
of ↓-Right is exactly to express distributivity formally, and that is why we must start
from ext U ∩ ext V = ext(U ↓ V ).
In this way we have obtained yet another de)nition of formal topology, simply as
a formal basic topology in which ↓-Right holds. To distinguish it from that given in
Section 2.1, one could call it a balanced formal topology, because the diCerence is the
presence of a binary positivity predicate and the absence of the condition of positivity
(see Section 1.2).
As I hinted at in Section 1.2, the variety of possible de)nitions is a richness which
one should not be afraid of. In fact, at this stage of development it is hard to see which
one will become the standard one. The diCerent requests on the positivity predicate
 seem to be the analogue of diCerent separation principles in pointwise topology.
Like in pointwise topology, it will take time to )nd out virtues and defects of each
assumption.
Some of the advantages of the de)nition given above are already clearly visible.
The )rst is that it has a solid structural motivation. In fact, the new predicate  is
the result of the isomorphism between concrete closed and formal closed subsets, and
at the same time it is the symmetric of the interior operator int and the dual of the
operator A, that is of the cover /. So  seems to be exactly what is necessary to
make the de)nition fully balanced. The second is that in this way it allows us to
introduce a natural notion of formal closed subset; recall that a subset U is said to
be formal closed if JU =U or equivalently if a  U→ aU . The third is that the
richness of the structure allows to see that it is better to get rid of the condition
called positivity (and study it as an extra assumption, if wished). In this way one
can obtain both the theory of locales (or frames) and the previous version of formal
topology as special cases. In fact, we say that J is improper when JU = ∅ for any
U ; then one is left essentially only with the cover /, which amounts to a predicative
formulation of frames. We say that J is trivial when JS and ∅ are the only two
formal closed subsets. One can prove constructively that J is trivial exactly when
it satis)es aJU→ a  H &H ⊆U for some monotone subset H (H is monotone if
a  H & a/U→H GU ; when J is trivial, put H ≡{a : aS}). So a formal topology in
the sense of De)nition 1 is obtained as a special case by de)ning Pos to be H and by
requiring the condition of positivity. Of course, a fourth advantage is that, as noticed
with the de)nition in Section 2.1, some important examples of formal topologies fall
under the new de)nition in a very natural way.
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I expect also other advantages, or applications, to become visible after learning how
the new expressive power—due to the presence of —can be exploited. Before that,
one has to adjust all the de)nitions and results of formal topology to take care also
of the binary positivity predicate . This does not look to be a routine task. As an
example, I give here the new de)nition of formal point. Another example is given in
Section 2.7.
The de)nition of formal point of a (balanced) formal topology S= (S; /;) is ob-
tained as usual by considering the case in which S is presentable. So assume that S
is the structure induced by a concrete space (X;; S) on the set S. The idea is )rst to
describe the formal properties of a subset ✸x traced on S by a concrete point x, and
take them as abstract conditions for a subset ⊆ S to be called a formal point (see
also Section 3.2.2). Recalling that ↓, / and  in the presentable case are de7ned by
means of concrete points, we see that the properties we need are simply
x  a x  b
x  a ↓ b ;
x  a a / U
x  U
;
x  a ✸x ⊆ U
aU :
The )rst says that (X;; S) satis)es B2, the second and third are just a re-formulation
of the de)nitions a /U ≡ ext a⊆ ext U and aU ≡ ext a G rest U . We also add
∃b(x b), which corresponds to B1. Now we can transform such properties into prop-
erties of ✸x by writing a ✸x in place of x a, and of course ✸x GU in place of
xU , and then take them as properties of an arbitrary ⊆ S. But if we now write
 a for a  , we see that the de)nition we look for is obtained by literally replacing
 for x in the properties above. So we have that ⊆ S is a formal point if
 is inhabited:  G S;
 is convergent:
  a   b
  a ↓ b ;
 splits /:
  a a / U
  U
(where   U ≡  G U );
 enters :   a  ⊆ U
aU :
The condition that  splits / is actually redundant (in fact, it can be deduced from 
enters Pos and compatibility), but I prefer to leave it explicit both to help intuition
and to see that, when  is trivial, the above de)nition gives back the de)nition of
formal point previously given in [32].
As a last remark, note that the de)nition becomes much shorter in the notation with
A, J and G. I leave it to readers to check that it is equivalent to  G S,  GU &  GV → 
GU ↓V ,  GAU→  GU ,  GU & ⊆F→U GJF .
2.5. Formal continuity and convergence
A notion of morphisms between formal (basic) topologies is introduced by following
the same methodology which led us to the notion of formal (basic) topology. That is,
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we consider the notion of morphism between basic pairs, alias relation-pair, and we
look for the properties which are enjoyed by its component on the formal side, with
respect to formal open and formal closed subsets. These will be the properties we
require to characterize morphisms between formal basic topologies.
It can be shown that a relation-pair (r; s) is equivalently presented by each of the
following two properties, symmetric to those mentioned in Section 2.3:
s✸D = ✸r D for any D ⊆ X;
which means that s is formal closed, and r is a method to determine the formal closed
subsets of T , which are the existential image of formal closed subsets of S along s;
s−∗ D = r−∗D; for any D ⊆ X;
which means that s−∗ is formal open, and r−∗ is a method to determine the formal
open subsets, which are the universal image of formal open subsets of S along s.
When only the formal side is considered, the relations r and r−∗ are lost, and
the properties characterizing morphisms between formal basic topologies are then just
the properties enjoyed by s. However, once r and r−∗ are forgotten, it is no longer
possible to prove the two conditions, that s is formal closed and that s−∗ is for-
mal open, to be equivalent to each other (two )nite counterexamples are given in
[18]). Hence both of them are required. Thus a morphism between two formal ba-
sic topologies S≡ (S;A;J) and T≡ (T;B;H) is a relation s : S→T such that i.
s is formal closed, that is U =JU→ sU =Hs U and ii. s−∗ is formal open, that is
U =AU→ s−∗U =Bs−∗U . We call it a formal continuous relation, and we denote
it by s : S→T. One can prove (see [18]) that, in the notation with  and /, the two
conditions on s are equivalent to:
a s b b / V
a / s−V
;
a s b as∗V
bV :
Several other equivalent characterizations are also possible, see [18].
Given any formal basic topology S, one can always de)ne the image of S along
any relation s : S→T , by setting sS≡T′≡ (T; s−∗As−; sJs∗). This is a formal basic
topology in which formal open subsets are just the universal images of formal open
subsets of S, and dually formal closed subsets are just the existential images of formal
closed subsets of S. It is the coarsest formal basic topology which makes s a formal
continuous relation.
Following this de)nition of image, it can happen that S satis)es ↓-Right, while its
image T′ does not. So the notion of formal continuous relation is not the right notion
of morphism between formal topologies. As the notion of formal topology was obtained
by describing axiomatically the formal side of a concrete space, that is a basic pair
satisfying B1 and B2, now the correct de)nition of morphism between formal topologies
is obtained by describing axiomatically the right component of a relation-pair which
preserves the validity of B1 and B2.
So assume that S is the formal topology which is presented by a concrete space
X= (X;; S). One can see that the image of S along a relation s : S→T is the same
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thing as the formal basic topology presented by the basic pair (X; s ◦ ; T ). Since
(s ◦ )− = ext s−, this satis)es B1 and B2 if ext s−T =X and ext s−b∩ ext s−d=
ext s−(b↓d), for any b; d∈T . But then, since X satis)es B1 and B2 (that is
ext S =X and ext U ∩ extV = ext(U ↓ V )), these two equations are equivalent to
ext s−T = ext S and ext(s−b ↓ s−d) = ext s−(b ↓ d), and hence )nally, by the iso-
morphism Sat(A) ∼= Red(int), also to As−T =AS and A(s−b ↓ s−d) =As−(b ↓ d),
for any b; d∈T . In the notation with /, these are equivalent to
totality S / s−T convergence s−b ↓ s−d / s−(b ↓ d):
So a morphism between formal topologies is de)ned to be a formal continuous relation
which satis)es totality and convergence; it is called a formal map. Now one can easily
check that the image T′ = sS of a formal topology S along a formal map is a formal
topology too.
The notion of morphism between formal topologies presented in [32] is easily seen
to be a special case of formal map. It is important to observe that the conditions of
totality and of convergence are automatically satis)ed by a relation s when it is the
right component of a relation pair (f; s), where f : X →Y is a function and (X;; S),
(Y;; T ) are concrete spaces (the proof is left to readers). This shows that, when only
functions are considered, the notion of continuity includes that of convergence.
The reason motivating the name of formal maps is that they induce functions between
the formal spaces determined by the formal topologies; actually, they are the predicative
way to present such maps. In fact, it is routine to check that whenever s : S→T is a
formal map between formal topologies and  is a formal point of S, then the image
s of the subset  along s is a formal point of T. Hence s induces a map between
Pt(S) and Pt(T).
A detailed treatment of formal continuous relations and of formal maps is given
in [18].
2.6. The problem of de7nitions
I have already noticed several times that the method to obtain the de)nition of a
formal notion is that of taking as formal axioms all the relevant properties which
hold in the presentable case. It is now time to analyse this more carefully. The main
problems are: what does it mean to take all properties? how can one be sure that there
are no other? And in any case, which are the right axioms for / and ?
Only recently it has become clear to me that the answers depend both on the choice
of the language (that is, of the primitives) and on the choice of the foundational
theory. We now see how the diCerent choices give diCerent results, in particular on
three speci)c questions: should closed subsets be uniquely determined by open subsets?
should the cover be always assumed to be inductively generated? should one assume
the condition of positivity (Pos(a)→ a / U )→ a / U? I will argue that in the most
basic approach the answer must be no to each question.
Assuming classical logic, as we have seen in Section 2.1, in any basic pair the equa-
tion cl=−int− holds. By the same reason, on the formal side J=−A−. Moreover,
classical logic guarantees compatibility of −A− with A to hold: AU G−A − V ↔
G. Sambin / Theoretical Computer Science 305 (2003) 347–408 381
U G−A − V is classically equivalent to AU ⊆A − V ↔ U ⊆A − V , which is the
characteristic property of closure operators. So our de)nition of formal basic topology
boils down classically to that of a set S with a closure operator A. In this sense, it
is not visible in a classical foundation. Note, however, that adding the law of double
negation on subsets −−U =U to our de)nition is not enough to make it trivial by
forcing J=−A− to hold: in fact, when A is the identity, any interior operator J is
trivially compatible with it. This seems to mean that the structure of basic topologies
has after all some stability which goes beyond foundations.
Allowing a quanti)cation over subsets, like in topos theory, given a set X with an
interior operator int, one can de)ne closure as usual by quantifying on all open subsets.
In fact, the very de)nition of cl in a basic pair, namely x cl D≡∀a(x a→ ext a GD),
can be expressed by
x CL(D) ≡ ∀E(x  int E → int E G D):
One can check directly that such CL is indeed a closure operator compatible with int,
and that actually it is the greatest of such operators. However, it is more instructive
to note that impredicatively the collection of open subsets is actually a set, de)ned by
{D⊆X : D= int D}. Then the above de)nition of CL coincides with the de)nition of
cl≡ rest✸ in the basic pair formed by X , the open subsets and xD≡ x  D.
On the formal side, by symmetry one can always de)ne a cover /2 impredicatively
in terms of a positivity predicate :
a /2 U ≡ ∀W (aW → U W ):
To get an intuitive grasp of this de)nition, one should compare it with the pointwise
de)nition of cover ∀x(x a→ xU ), and recall that aW expresses formally the
existence of a point in ext a∩ rest W .
So also in the impredicative case the full structure of basic topology would not be
visible, since one can always choose the cover, and hence formal open subsets, to be
uniquely determined by formal closed subsets. Moreover, when /2 is de)ned as above,
the formal topology (S; /2;) is actually presentable (with X the set of formal closed
subsets and U  a≡ a  U ). So the reasons for introducing formal topologies in this
context are not so compelling. It is still unknown to me whether, conversely, one can
)nd a similar impredicative de)nition of the positivity predicate in terms of a given
cover /. In the special case of a trivial positivity predicate Pos which moreover satis)es
positivity, this is well known, and the de)nition is Pos(a)≡∀U (a / U→U G S).
Also in a foundation based on the notion of computation, such as Martin-L2of ’s type
theory, there are some good reasons for a less general notion of formal basic topology
than that given here. In fact, because of the validity of the axiom of choice, the cover
de)ned on the formal side of a basic pair is always inductively generated (this was
remarked by Martin–L2of, a proof is in [10]). So it is natural to require inductive
generation of the cover / as part of the de)nition. In this case, a positivity predicate is
uniquely determined, and it is the greatest positivity predicate that is compatible with
/, which is de)ned by co-induction, as shown here in Section 2.7. In the same spirit,
one can prove that for a relation between two such formal basic topologies to be a
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formal continuous relation it is enough that it respects the axioms. In this sense the
two conditions de)ning formal continuous relations are no longer independent. It is to
be recalled, however, that here too the request that  be determined by / remains a
choice, and is not a theorem (see the result by Valentini mentioned in Section 2.7).
The foundation we have been working with so far is essentially just intuitionistic
many sorted logic. No assumption is made on the nature of sets; in particular, no axiom
of choice and no powerset axiom are assumed to be valid. So there is no principle
which allows to reconstruct that half of topology, dealing with existential statements
and with closed subsets, in terms of the other half, namely universal statements and
open subsets. This is why one can never forget either of them. The main conceptual
advantage is that the resulting mathematics respects both the intuition of computation,
which underlies the justi)cation of the axiom of choice, and the intuition of some kind
of continuity, by which one can sometimes be in the position of knowing a statement
of the form ∀x∃y to hold also without having a function giving y in terms of x.
A deeper analysis and a precise formulation of such a basic foundation is still to
be done. This should not be, however, an obstacle for doing mathematics. A )rmer
grasp will probably come after some more advanced technical development and some
speci)c applications. In my opinion, however, just studying that part of topology which
is compatible both with Martin–L2of ’s type theory and with topos theory is de)nitely
worthwhile.
Since the language is not fully speci)ed, the problem of completeness remains open:
does the de)nition of formal basic topology gather all the properties induced on the
formal side of a basic pair? This is an interesting logical problem. 13 In my opinion,
however, rather than looking for a formal expression of existing de)nitions, it is more
interesting to investigate whether working—even informally—on a diCerent foundation
can bring to a theory, such as the basic picture, with an intrinsic mathematical mean-
ing. It seems to me that this is possible, and that the basic picture can be characterized
structurally as the theory of what remains invariant under transfer along a (continu-
ous) relation. I now brieHy explain some technical facts which seem to support this
expectation.
Since the whole basic picture begins with an analysis of images of subsets along
a relation, a crucial step forward is to obtain a structural, or mathematical charac-
terization of arbitrary relations and of images along them. To this aim, the language
of categories is of great help. Thus we think of PX and PS as categories with the
operators ∩;∪;⋃i∈I ;⋂i∈I and with the predicates ⊆ and G. Then the operators on
13 To solve this problem, one must deal with the speci)c problem of the property of positivity (see
Section 1). It can be shown (see [37]) that positivity is equivalent to the equation AU =A(U ∩JS),
which in the presentable case is valid simply by intuitionistic logic. Still, I believe it is better not to put
it among the axioms. One reason is the fact that, as communicated to me by Coquand and Valentini, if
the cover is )nitary and positivity holds, then JS, alias Pos, is decidable (so a statement in Section 4
of [32] is wrong, by the subtle mistake of assuming wrongly that the intersection of a )nite subset with
an arbitrary subset is again )nite). This would mean that in general the compacti)cation of a given formal
topology would not be a formal topology. Another reason is that it is still to be checked whether positivity
is respected by continuous relations. And )nally note that in any case one can add positivity as an extra
assumption and study the class of topologies in which it holds.
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subsets, beginning with ext; rest;✸; , are best thought of as functors. We have seen
that they form two pairs of adjoint functors, ext and ✸ rest. But if we consider
two arbitrary pairs of adjoint functors F G and F ′ G′, with F;G′ : PX →PS and
F ′; G : PX ← PS, nothing is said about the fact that they are induced by the same
relation, or better by a relation and by its converse.
It is well known that any adjunction F G between PX and PS is induced by a rela-
tion between X and S. In fact, the left adjoint functor F respects unions, and hence one
can de)ne r: X → S by putting x r a≡ a  F{x} and then obtain that F(D) = ⋃x  D F{x}
≡ ⋃x  D r x≡ r(D). So F is the same as the existential image along r. Since r  r∗,
by the uniqueness of adjoints G= r∗ holds. Assuming a second pair F ′ G′ of adjoint
functors in the opposite direction tells us that there is a second relation r′ : X ← S
such that F ′ = r′ and G′ = r′∗. So now the problem is: which condition should one add
to characterize abstractly the fact that r′ = r−? The answer is, a posteriori, incredibly
simple: r′ = r− holds if and only if the two existential functors F and F ′ are linked
by
F(D) G U if and only if D G F ′(U ) for any D ⊆ X;U ⊆ S: (3)
In fact, if r′ = r− then (3) holds, because for an arbitrary r we have
r(D) G U if and only if D G r−(U ) for any D ⊆ X;U ⊆ S: (4)
(this is easily checked by intuitionistic logic). Conversely, if F = r, F ′ = r′ and (3)
holds, then for every x∈X and a∈ S we have x  r′a iC {x} G r′a iC r x G {a} iC
{x} G r−a iC x  r−a, that is r′ = r−. I call (4) the fundamental symmetry, and say
that two functors F , F ′ satisfying (3) are symmetric, written F ·|· F ′.
It is thus proved that four functors F;G′ : PX →PS and F ′; G : PX ← PS are those
induced by a relation r : X → S, that is F = r, G= r∗, F ′ = r−, G′ = r−∗, if and only if
they form two adjoint pairs F G, F ′ G′ and, moreover, F is symmetric to F ′, F ·|·F ′.
This I suggest to call a symmetric pair of adjunctions. This useful characterization is
natural and simple only because of the presence of G (and actually, it was discovered
only after the introduction of this notation). It is now possible to take it as a guideline
to obtain formal de)nitions. One can now see that the )rst formal de)nition, namely
that of formal basic topology, is just the result of transferring the structure of the power
of the set X (including also G) onto the set S through a symmetric pair of adjunctions.
In fact, the compositions G′F ′ and FG, acting on S, are well known to be a closure
and an interior operator, respectively. Recalling that when the relation r is denoted
by  we use the notation r =✸, r∗ = rest, r− = ext and r−∗ = , these compositions
are nothing but J≡✸rest=FG and A≡ ext=G′F ′. We now can see further that
compatibility is the result of transferring G from X to S. In fact, G′F ′U GFGV if and
only if F ′G′F ′U GGV (because F ·|·F ′) if and only if F ′U GGV (because F ′G′F ′ =F ′)
if and only if U GFGV (again because F ·|· F ′).
We can similarly see the de)nition of formal continuous relation as the result
of transferring an arbitrary relation r : X →Y along two relations 1 : X → S and
2 : Y →T . In fact, de)ning s : S→T by setting s≡ 2 ◦ r ◦1−, and consider-
ing the formal basic topologies induced on S and on T , we see immediately that s
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is formal closed and that s−∗ is formal open. Now the idea of invariance is that if
we repeat the process, that is look for the structure which is preserved under transfer
along a relation starting from a formal basic topology S rather than PX and from a
formal continuous relation s rather than an arbitrary relation r, we should obtain again
the same notions of formal basic topology and of formal continuous relation. This is
still to be understood better. A remarkable result by Gebellato seems to be a good
starting point. It says that the afore-mentioned characterization of arbitrary relations as
symmetric pairs of adjunctions can be “topologized” and extended to a characterization
of a formal continuous relation s: S→T as a symmetric pair of adjunctions between
the lattices of open and of closed subsets in S and T. See [19] for a precise statement
and proof.
2.7. The dark side of the moon
The treatment of existential statements, or of statements of the form ∃∀ like that
in the de)nition of interior, is the dark side of the mathematical planet. They have
usually been reduced either to a negation (as in classical logic, where ∃ is the same as
¬∀¬ and hence closed is the same as complement of open, see Section 2.1) or to an
impredicative quanti)cation (closure de)ned in terms of all open subsets). The main
aim of the basic picture, and of formal topology developed on it, is the beginning
of a more direct, positive exploration of that kind of information which is usually
treated as negative. Only time and further work will tell whether the mathematics
which is beginning to come out is interesting and with interesting new applications.
My expectation is that it should )nd applications in those sciences in which a careful
management of information seems important, like computer science, theoretical biology
and perhaps quantum theory.∗ However, the task of a mathematician at this stage is
still that of investigating the mathematical aspects, basing on internal criteria, such as
structure or mathematical aesthetics.
Speci)cally, the aim is to develop a mathematics which keeps on the scene as
primitive also the notions which are connected with existential quanti)cations. The
introduction of the notation G for meet has this purpose; in fact, it allows to transform
logical argumentations involving the existential quanti)er into mathematical arguments
involving G, which are based on a spatial intuition. The )rst step is then to treat
closed subsets as independent of open subsets. On the formal side, this brings us to
the introduction of the positivity predicate  besides the cover /. The exploration of
the dark side should now consist mainly in working out which are the right conditions
which must be added to previous de)nitions and which take care of G, closed subsets,
 and of notions connected with them. We have already seen one example, namely
the de)nition of formal point. We now see another, more striking example, that is the
generation of the positivity predicate  by co-induction.
∗Added in proof. This expectation has become true earlier than I expected: Peter Hancock and Pierre
Hyvernat (in their recent paper “Interaction, computer science and formal topology”) have shown that basic
topologics have promising applications in the )eld of computer science.
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It has been shown in [10] that the most general way to generate a formal cover
on a set S is to start from a family of sets I(a)set(a∈ S) and a family of subsets
C(a; i)⊆ S(a∈ S; i∈ I(a)). The intuition is that I(a) is a set of indexes for the covers
of a, and that C(a; i) is the cover of a with index i, taken as an axiom. Then a cover
/ (I mean, / reHexive and transitive) is generated inductively simply by the rules (see
[10])
a  U
a / U
i ∈ I(a) C(a; i) / U
a / U
: (5)
The new idea now is to generate the largest predicate  compatible with / by co-
induction, that is by forcing compatibility to hold by successively taking away elements
which do not satisfy it. Given that / is generated from axioms a / C(a; i), to force
compatibility it is enough to consider this case. And of course one must also force
co-reHexivity to hold. So the rules are
aU
a U
;
aU i ∈ I(a)
C(a; i)U :
The relation / is the minimal relation satisfying the rules written in (5). This means
that for every subset U , the subset AU ≡{a∈ S : a/U} is the least among the subsets
P satisfying U ⊆P and C(b; i)⊆P→ b  P for any b∈ S and i∈ I(b). In other terms,
the following principle of induction holds:
[i ∈ I(b); C(b; i) ⊆ P]
|
a / U U ⊆ P b  P
a  P
:
Dually, for every U the subset JU ≡{a∈ S : aU} is the largest among the subsets
Q such that Q⊆U and b  Q→C(b; i) GQ for any b∈ S and i∈ I(b). So the following
principle of co-induction holds:
[b  Q; i ∈ I(b)]
|
a  Q Q ⊆ U C(b; i) G Q
aU :
Using these two principles, it is possible to prove that (S; /;) is indeed a formal
basic topology. By combining this with the treatment of ↓-Right in [10], one can also
easily generate balanced formal topologies. This shows at least that there is a wealth
of examples for the new de)nitions.
Moreover, there is a wealth of examples also of formal continuous relations. In fact,
assume that S is generated as above by I , C and that T is similarly generated by
J (b)set(b∈T ) and D(b; j)⊆T (b∈T; j∈ J (b)). Assume that s : S→T is any relation
respecting the axioms, that is satisfying s−b /S s−D(b; j) for any b∈T and j∈ J (b).
Then one can prove by induction that s−∗ is formal open and by co-induction that s
is formal closed.
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The idea of a co-inductive generation of  )rst came to Martin–L2of, in July 1996
soon after several conversations by the author on the basic picture and in particular on
the ∀∃-∃∀ duality between open and closed subsets. A joint paper is in preparation,
which will include also a game theoretic interpretation of / and . Valentini has later
shown that one can force  to satisfy any given axioms, fully independently of the
axioms for /. This shows that there is a wealth of examples in which formal closed
subsets are by no means determined by formal open ones.
Some other mathematical developments connected with G and  are in progress.
In particular, Sara Sadocco is working on an algebraization of the structure of PX in
which G is taken as primitive, besides ⊆.
3. Some principles, some reections
The aim of this )nal section is to give an organic, though preliminary, exposition of
the reHections of a general character—on the meaning of mathematics, of constructive
mathematics in particular, and on the role of foundational assumptions in the speci)c
case of topology—which have always accompanied my work in formal topology (and
which subjectively cannot be separated from it).
In my opinion, one should start from the beginning, that is from general questions
like: what is mathematics? what is its meaning? etc. My general attitude, which I
call dynamic constructivism, can now be found in [36]. So I can here concentrate, in
Section 3.1, on seven principles which are a bit closer to the mathematical practice
and a consequence of the general philosophy. Section 3.2 contains comments which
apply to the speci)c case of topology, and of the present approach in particular. They
should help to understand the reasons of some mathematical choices made here.
I hope that the resulting survey will contribute to straighten an odd situation: in
fact, I talk explicitly about matters which mathematicians tend to leave to philosophers,
while philosophers treat them so generally that they produce very little interest among
mathematicians. The reader I ideally address to is an open-minded mathematician.
3.1. The seven principles of dynamic constructivism
3.1.1. Genuine answers
I believe that the )rst principle of any scientist, and premiss to all other, should
be that of giving nothing for true unless personally veri)ed, a sort of cultural allergy
to truth “by authority” and to any matter of faith. Thus one should have a genuine
answer, with good arguments, to any question in and about mathematics, beginning
with that one which is the simplest to put: what is mathematics?
In my opinion mathematics is best conceived as a human tool for human knowledge.
So no God’s eye point of view is necessary, or convenient: also if God exists, it remains
up to our responsibility to interpret what he=she says. An acceptable de)nition is then
that mathematics is the study of abstract mental structures, related to counting, measure,
grouping, shape, motions, vicinity, etc., and their applications. Whatever de)nition one
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prefers, mathematics is considered as the most reliable knowledge we can reach: one
could even de)ne it in this way.
The main reason to study constructive mathematics is in the end—in my opinion—
simply that it is more reliable and allows to know more than classical mathematics;
this is not reliable enough, since it betrays our intuition (see [36]).
3.1.2. Constructivism as awareness and modularity
It is well known that many kinds of constructivism have been proposed. Brouwer’s
intuitionism has appeared, in the scale of history, immediately after Cantor’s exploration
of the in)nite, and it can be described as an answer to it. It can be characterized by the
presence of mental constructions, which means that no actual in)nite is possible, and
hence by the rejection of the excluded third. In the dilemma of inward-outward reality,
classical mathematics chooses outward reality, including a notion of truth as already
given. It was Brouwer who )rst spoke openly about intuition (which etymologically
comes from look inside) and internal reality, showing how it can be linked with a
conception of mathematics.
Among the possible ways to avoid the paradoxes, PoincarYe and others insisted on
predicativism: a mathematical object (notably: a subset) cannot be de)ned in terms
of the collection to which it belongs. Hence, one cannot quantify over all subsets to
introduce a new subset; or positively, one can quantify only when a meaning can be
given to ∀, ∃, hence surely at least when all the elements of the domain are generated
by )xed rules.
Topos theory (on which locale theory is traditionally based) is intuitionistic but not
predicative. Martin-L2of ’s type theory (since 1970) is an intuitionistic and predicative
set theory, which includes logic via the “propositions-as-sets” interpretation, and solves
the problems connected with Russell’s type theory. The distinction between set and type
is essential; all the elements of a set are generated by rules which can be speci)ed in
advance.
Which kind of constructivism should one choose? We )rst have to make it clear what
we should mean by constructivism. We are lucky that today it is possible to appreciate
the value of constructivity without any speci)c ideological measure: the preservation of
intuition, or faithfulness to reality, has now become also preservation of information,
or of computational content (in computers).
It is impossible to work in mathematics, intuitively and informally as usual, and in
the same time keep all the information. If we keep too close to the machine level,
there will be too many details, and hence too many complications. Some ideal notions
are necessary.
So control cannot be the same as preservation of all the information. My general
principle is that constructivism is not a static self-imposed limitation to full information,
but rather awareness of which idealization has been made to build up an abstract
concept, and to express it formally.
To simplify the complexity of raw data, one has to idealize, that is, to forget or
destroy some data. Classical mathematics is simple, because it is based on a very
strong idealization, or destruction, and with very little awareness. But also a rigid self-
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limitation, like when )xing a formal system once for all, means little awareness of
destruction. Dynamic constructivism cannot be reduced to a formal system, but it must
remain a cultural attitude: to be aware of idealizations (that is, of what is forgotten)
and hence to know what one can obtain with certain tools and certain principles.
In practice, an important aim is to develop mathematics, as much as possible, in a
basic, or minimal theory, which is so neuter that it preserves (and hence is compatible
with) all kinds of intuitions with which we feed it. In particular, it must be open-ended,
both in the notion of proposition and in that of truth of propositions, and hence it must
be predicative and intuitionistic, respectively. In fact, since in a constructive approach
a subset of a set X is the same as a propositional function over X , a quanti)cation over
subsets of X in an essential way (that is, to de)ne a new entity) means considering
the notion of proposition to be fully determined, and thus leaving no room for future
developments. Similarly, the law of excluded middle leaves no room for future increase
of knowledge, or truth.
I had chosen at )rst Martin–L2of ’s type theory as a foundation. Among the existing
foundations, it is in my opinion with no doubt the most convincing among those dealing
both with technical and with philosophical problems. In fact, it gives a clear meaning to
all basic mathematical and logical notions, and in the same time it is a formal system
very carefully designed to keep full control of information (and in fact it is also a
computer language, see Section 3.2.1). Exactly because of this property, Martin–L2of ’s
type theory enjoys a strong existence property: the witness which allows to prove an
existential statement (∃x∈D)A(x) is encoded in a proof c of (∃x∈D)A(x) and can
regained, within the formal system, by the projection functions giving p(c)∈D and
q(c)∈A(p(c)). So the so-called axiom of choice is validated, actually, it is rigorously
provable.
Martin-L2of ’s type theory seems thus perfect to deal with computations. However it
is well known that the axiom of choice is constructively incompatible with powersets
(see footnote 2). But it is a fact that in the development of formal topology the axiom
of choice is used rarely enough that one can leave it out, and assume it only when
necessary, and then with explicit mention. It is certainly never used in all the results
mentioned in Section 2 here.
As regards the foundation as a formal system, this means that one has to abandon
the proposition-as-set interpretation which is usually at the base of Martin-L2of ’s type
theory, and give intuitionistic logic on propositions, with its usual inference rules,
separately from sets. In this way one can keep the notion of set exactly as in Martin-
L2of ’s type theory, and have a notion of proposition which does not satisfy the strong
existence property (note: the existence property continues to hold, it is just that to
obtain the witness one has to pass through the metalanguage). It is not my most
urgent aim to formalize rigorously such a theory, but rather to see where it can bring
us in the development of mathematics (see Section 3.1.4).
Such a foundation is fully compatible with the addition of quanti)cations over all
subsets, and thus also with a direct geometric intuition, such as that behind topos
theory or choice sequences. So most of the results of formal topology (that is, as
long as the axiom of choice is not used) hold in an arbitrary topos. Conversely, a
considerable portion of locale theory (by which I mean pointfree topology developed
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over the foundation of topos theory) is not possible predicatively, and hence is absent
from formal topology.
There are at least four good reasons which make well worth the trouble of developing
a piece of mathematics, like formal topology, over a “minimalist” foundation such as
the one described above. The )rst is that it works, in the sense that it is suMcient to
express topological notions and to work with them. The second is that it allows to see
that the real basis of topology is explicitly that of symmetry and logical duality, rather
than implicitly that of some notion of set, which is bound to often silent philosophical
assumptions. The third reason is to begin a modular approach to the development of
mathematics and the study of its foundations. Starting from a minimal foundational
theory and developing mathematics over it, allows to analyse which parts and which
peculiarities of mathematics depend on further foundational assumptions. This, rather
than the choice of one foundational theory, should be in my opinion the study of
foundations. In a certain sense, all means, that is all assumptions are allowed, also
if beyond the basic type theory, as long as it remains clear when they are active. In
fact, the rejection of a principle is not due to some kind of moralistic contempt or of
ideological attitude, but rather seen as a method to keep some positive general features
of mathematics as developed in the basic theory. Then it should be clear that there is
nothing wrong, even for a convinced constructivist, to speak about some classical or
impredicative results, as long as no confusion is made. In fact, it is often useful to be
able to look at things from a certain distance and thus to put an upper bound to what
one can hope to prove constructively. The fourth reason is that the actual development
of mathematics in a “weak” theory helps to extend the territory of mathematics itself
(see Section 3.1.4).
3.1.3. Forget safely
Assume that constructivism involves a strict control of information and, in particu-
lar, awareness of the information which has been forgotten, or destroyed, to be able
to obtain a certain idealized concept. Then the idea is to develop mathematics directly
treasuring constructivity, that is, being very careful when throwing away some infor-
mation, in case it is not possible to restore it. This is the reason why a constructive
treatment carries on more details than the classical one. The computational content is
kept along the way, rather than put on top of a )nished non-constructive work, when
it may be too late. The typical example is that of the existential quanti)er ∃. There is
no way to prove constructively an existential statement except by having a witness or
by a previous existential quanti)er (with its witness). This is why ∃ is kept distinct
from ¬∀¬. If ∃ is identi)ed with ¬∀¬, the information about the witness is soon lost
in an irreversible way. 14 So the choice for such identi)cation, which might look as the
choice for a “stronger” logical principle, actually means that the witness information
is considered to be irrelevant.
14 A nice example, from everyday life, is when, contrary to the rules of a serious craftsman, an antique
piece of furniture is restored by cleaning it with sandpaper. One so abstracts from “dirt”, but in this way its
patina is lost and its age is forgotten, and hence the commercial value destroyed, in an irreversible way!
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If awareness of destruction is the aim, then the ideal situation is to forget only when
it is safe, that is, forget only that information which can be restored when needed,
maybe by passing through the metalanguage (that is, for instance, by inspecting the
proof of a certain statement). It is possible to give a mathematical form to this principle,
which I call the forget-restore principle: an ideal notion can be introduced, by forgetting
some information, only if it is eCectively conservative, that is, if it can be reduced to
the underlying type theory in such a way that also proof-terms, which express the
computational content, can be restored.
The formal setup of Martin-L2of ’s type theory works perfectly well for this purpose.
In fact, it provides us with a total control of information, and hence it is easier to keep
track of what is forgotten. Moreover, type theory is known to be correct, either by
direct meaning explanations or by normalization arguments. So to develop constructive
mathematics it is enough to enrich it with some abstract “utilities”, beginning with a
notation closer to the usual style of mathematicians. Purging mathematics from all what
does not strictly fall into the formalism of type theory would sacri)ce human intuition,
and in the end it would rightly be felt as a form of penance. Of course, any abstract
tool which is introduced must preserve not only consistency, but also constructivity,
and thus it must obey the forget-restore principle explained above. This has been done,
for instance, for the notion of subset, see Section 1.3.1.
This also gives a new meaning—the only constructively possible, in my opinion—to
Hilbert’s program. One could call it the humble Hilbert program, because rather than
trying to justify all of mathematics in one shot, the goal is to do it bit by bit, and add
each safe bit to the basic theory, which is known to be safe.
It is certainly convenient to do this in a modular way, that is in such a way that
diCerent tools can be put together at will, one on top of the other. For this purpose,
preservation of predicativity seems to be necessary. In fact, quantifying over all subsets
to introduce a new tool means that the notion of subset is blocked, and this can be
incompatible with the addition of a second tool, like a new set-constructor.
For some other comments, see [39] and Section 3.2.1. See also [46] for another
example following the forget-restore principle.
3.1.4. New foundations must give new mathematics
Reality is too complex, chaotic even. It is a need of ours to organize it in some
way, looking for patterns, regularities, abstract concepts. This is anyway something we
impose on reality, and to obtain it we have to forget details, that is idealize. Mathe-
matics is an important tool for this general aim. The diCerent foundations correspond
to diCerent choices of how reality is simpli)ed.
Classical mathematics corresponds to the strongest idealization: all what is consistent
is assumed to exist by itself. All propositions, all subsets, all objects of mathematics
live in a single and static world, which has been and will always be as it is now. The
task of mathematicians is just that of discovering what is already there and true in
itself.
There must be a good reason to push one to abandon such a simple view. It is a
common opinion that the purpose of constructive mathematics is to repeat constructively
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as much as possible of classical mathematics. If this were the only aim, constructive
mathematics would soon become boring (I believe that this view is actually one of
the reasons explaining why so few mathematicians work in constructive mathematics,
see Section 3.2.5). On the contrary, I believe that the real motivation for choosing
a diCerent foundation is that it leads to some new mathematics, which would not be
possible otherwise.
For instance, choosing category theory and intuitionistic logic has brought to the
novelty of topos theory. The novelty of mathematics over a predicative foundation is
usually measured in terms of computation. It is well known that mathematics developed
predicatively, in particular if within type theory, is automatically formalizable in a com-
puter system, and hence can for instance be checked mechanically (see Section 3.2.1).
This is sometimes considered to be the reason for developing predicative mathematics.
Certainly, it is extremely important and interesting, but according to my personal taste
not always so exciting intellectually. It would not be worthwhile for me to take pains
to avoid excluded third and powersets if the aim were only that of con)rming what
already exists. The purpose of a new foundation must be that of )nding some new
mathematics, that is new ways to organize reality into conceptual structures.
The crucial step for this change of attitude is to perceive the refusal of “powerful”
principles not as a more or less meritorious deprivation, but rather as a re)nement of
mathematical instruments, and hence a source of richness. After all, allowing oneself
powerful principles for any purpose and in any situation is not so diCerent from using a
butcher knife also when a surgeon knife would be more suitable. A less brutal metaphor
is that of wearing always a pair of coloured glasses, so that not all colours can be
distinguished.
A “weak” foundation allows for distinctions which are impossible otherwise. It is
known that intuitionistic logic is more re)ned than classical logic, in that it keeps
logical constants distinct. One begins to see that the same holds for a predicative
foundation, which keeps the distinction between a set and its power, otherwise lost in
an irreversible way (see also Section 3.2.2).
The method of reducing assumptions to obtain deep and general structures is well
known in mathematics, at least since the beginning of abstract algebra. The same hap-
pens with foundations: trying to express a concept in a language with )ner distinctions,
like a weak foundation, often produces deeper understanding and new structures, that is
new mathematics. To see this happen in practice, it is necessary to put that foundation
at work and actually use it to do mathematics. Proving metamathematically that some-
thing is possible does not help much to discover new things. Conversely, the awareness
acquired by users often improves the understanding of the role of some foundational
principles. So I see the study of foundations as a dynamic process which is active in
both directions, rather than a justi)cation a posteriori of something taken as given.
Using type theory, and actually only the small fragment coinciding essentially with
many sorted intuitionistic logic, to develop topology has produced the new mathematics
which I call the basic picture. The materials on which it is based are (no plastic or
sand, nor any ideological assumption, but) the hardest a logician and a mathematician
can expect, namely very elementary logical dualities and geometrical symmetry. The
duality underlying the notions of closed and open gives a strong motivation for a study
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of topology, both pointwise and pointfree, in which the notion of closed is primitive like
that of open. The symmetry between the concrete and the formal side allows to embed
both the pointwise and the pointfree approach to topology in a uni)ed framework.
All of this would probably never have seen the light in a diCerent foundation. It
is the use of a minimalist foundation which forces one to )nd new explanations,
and hence new structures. As discussed in Section 2.6, classical logic would bring to
the identi)cation of closed with complement of open, and thus their duality would
collapse to complementation. Impredicativity would make the set on the formal side
always de)nable as the set of open subsets. Thus in any case the basic picture would
remain just a consistent but funny option, and thus it would escape to our attention
(as it has been, as a matter of facts). One thus can see that in a precise sense stronger
foundations begin with being less constructive, and end with being more destructive.
3.1.5. Compatibility
At the origins of constructive mathematics, it was natural for Brouwer to oppose to
classical mathematics. He had to break the ice and conquer attention. Perhaps for this
reason, he introduced some principles which are incompatible with classical mathemat-
ics. These assumptions are actually not necessary to develop constructive mathematics.
For this reason (and for the birth of computers) constructive mathematics today is less
ideological.
As a principle, constructive mathematics should be developed while taking care that
all de)nitions and proofs are compatible with a classical reading. This is possible by
using a toolbox of notions and notations which allows one to use common mathematical
language and still guarantees formalizability in the basic type theory.
pt The main purpose of compatibility with a classical reading is communication
between diCerent traditions. So I also believe that some speci)c words introduced
by Brouwer, like spread, species, etc., should now be replaced by those common
among mathematicians, like tree, set, etc. It is a diCerent reading which must give
the diCerent interpretations (in the same way as written Chinese is read in diCerent
ways).
Full compatibility should avoid miserable )ghts, as at the times of Hilbert and
Brouwer (assuming we don’t have the same diMcult character). The matter should
not be a choice of side in the battle )eld, but simply of the kind of quality of infor-
mation one is interested in.
Compatibility should encourage communication also at the level of contents. On one
hand, high idealization is often useful to constructivists, either to get inspiration or
to foresee what cannot be expected, that is to get negative information. On the other
hand, classicists can appreciate at least the technical improvements often accompanying
a constructive formulation. By the principle of tolerance, they are left free to destroy
information and structure, if this remains their will.
3.1.6. Importance of de7nitions
The classical mathematician tends to believe that doing mathematics mainly coincides
with producing proofs. In a constructive approach, choosing the right de)nitions is also
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important. Actually, choosing de)nitions and testing them to be correct is the main part
of the work. To choose the right balance between simple idealization and the amount
of information to be kept is at least as diMcult as to prove a theorem in a classical
approach. But on the other hand, adopting good constructive de)nitions usually has the
eCect that proofs become much easier, reasonable and perspicuous. And so it must be:
if we want constructive mathematics to reHect our intuition better, then a proof should
not come so much as a surprise.
Two principles have turned out to be helpful when looking for good constructive def-
initions. Since, as a matter of facts, the classical de)nitions exist and are well known,
one can start from them and consider them as a )rst, strong idealization. The phe-
nomenon of the intuitionistic “diCraction” of classical de)nitions is well known: many
classically equivalent characterizations of the same notion are no longer equivalent
in intuitionistic logic, and thus the same classical notion may correspond to several
diCerent intuitionistic notions. Since the law of excluded third identi)es existential
statements with negation of universal statements, to obtain the intuitionistic version
one has to understand which are the positive existential statements which have been
confused with negative ones. With predicativity another similar phenomenon becomes
observable. In fact, because of the powerset axioms, in an impredicative approach sets
are confused with collections, and the information that something is a set is lost. So to
add predicativity one has to restore and keep on the scene those sets, or other entities,
which have been forgotten on the assumption that they can be reconstructed by an
impredicative principle.
In both cases something has been left out. Thus one should reverse the perspective: it
is not a matter of translating a classical de)nition which is assumed to be right. Rather,
the )rst principle is to assume that the constructive de)nition to be found is the correct
one, and that a less constructive one has been obtained by forgetting unsafely some of
its components. In practice, the diMcult and creative part is to discover and put back
what the standard de)nition has left out. Type theory is very suitable for this purpose,
since a predicative formulation is often nothing but the expression of a given notion
in the formalism of type theory (this is somehow analogous to the fact that de)ning
something in the categorical terms of objects and arrows often is the same as )nding
its right structure).
The second principle is to recall that compatibility (see Section 3.1.5) must include
also de)nitions. That is, the constructive de)nition, whenever possible, should be read-
able, exactly with the same words, by classical mathematicians and give an equivalent
to their de)nition (of course, their reading of “set” and “exists” will be diCerent: this
is their taste!).
All these general remarks become very well visible when speci)ed to topology.
First, in the standard approach one assumes the family of open subsets to form a
set (rather than a subcollection of the collection of all subsets). In this way the in-
formation on how it has been presented, for instance by means of a function from
a second set as in a concrete space or by a direct inductive generation of a for-
mal topology, is lost completely. By these reasons the standard de)nition is split into
three diCerent constructive notions: concrete space, formal topology, formal space (see
Section 3.2.2 for more on this). Secondly, since the law of excluded third identi)es
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closed subsets with complements of open subsets, some creativity was necessary to
realize that the real link between open and closed is a rich logical duality, and not just
complementation.
The basic picture somehow “proves” the correctness of the constructive de)nitions
by showing in detail on what ground structure they are based. And yet all is perfectly
readable also for a classical mathematician (who will anyway wonder about the reason
for so many useless distinctions and additions).
3.1.7. Harmony, ecology and aesthetics
Mathematics is one of the achievements of which humanity is rightly proud. To-
gether with arts, science, ethics, etc., it is a part of culture, and this can be seen as a
continuation of natural evolution within the human species. Creating and exploring the
world of mathematics can be a fascinating and exciting experience. It becomes also
a pleasure and a real enrichment of mental life if this is done in full harmony with
nature and with the nature of human mind. Mathematical knowledge should be free of
any supernatural interference, that is will, prejudice, dogma, expectation or fear. This
cultural attitude is in my opinion the deepest motivation for constructive mathematics.
One could even say that it de7nes when mathematics is constructive. Brouwer was
well aware of this, but he was apparently ahead of his times.
When a notion of knowledge and truth as harmony with nature begins to be a part of
one’s view of the world, then one begins to realize that, contrary to a common belief,
it is the classical approach which is less free, since it forces reality into unnatural
principles. The sharp division of the world between good-truth and evil-falsity appears
as the mathematical continuation of a childish wish of omnipotence. To justify it, one
is bound to adhere to some kind of faith, like the existence of platonic ideas, or even
worse to divide the self, that is split body from soul, form from content, and retain
only the shadow of truth which is materially perceivable in formulae.
A respectful attitude in doing mathematics is something one has to learn, or actually
to teach oneself, since very few of us have been educated to it (just as very few have
been educated to a respectful use of resources). It may look at the beginning that
giving up supposedly strong principles is like self-inHicting a punishment or even a
mutilation; even some followers of constructivism have felt this way. Getting rid of
dogmas, breaking the rigidity due to fears and accepting that the world continues to
be what it is independently of our personal absolute certainties: all of this certainly is
a cost in psychic terms. But only in this way one can learn to see things as they are,
and hence reach a higher stage of awareness and knowledge. And since mathematics is
mostly a mental organization of abstract concepts, to reach a stage in which it becomes
a fully natural, meaningful and convincing activity, one has to strive for and keep a
strong internal harmony between the diCerent aspects of mathematical thought, namely
spatial intuition, computation and logical deduction. This is the therapy I suggest to
get cured from the schizophrenia in contemporary mathematics pointed out by Bishop
[5] and reach what he calls “integrity”. In other words, it is the recipe I propose to
build a world of mathematics which is not strange to ourselves and hence in which it
is a pleasure to live and work.
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I believe that this is really possible and not just wishful thinking. I am not proposing
a dramatic revolution, the repetition of a putsch or pure mystical contemplation with
no practical value; this fears should now be only a bad memory from the past. The
aim is not to “hasten the inevitable day when constructive mathematics will be the
accepted norm” ([4], my italic), but the day in which all mathematicians will be free
and free to choose constructive mathematics, because they will be fully aware of the
right foundation for each purpose. If anything is at all inevitable, this to my eyes
is the day when it will be realized (perhaps after deeper use of computers) that the
classical foundation is not good for all purposes. The fact that so many still believe it
is, remains to my mind one of the unsolvable puzzles of our culture. In fact, even if
one disregards positive arguments in favour of alternatives, one should at least realize
that depending on a single foundation in our mental life is as dangerous as depending
on a single source of energy (like oil) in our material life.
What I propose is simply to reach a more balanced view and to begin in practice by
putting more energy in the development of alternatives, that is in the direct development
of mathematics over diCerent foundations. It makes no sense to charge any kind of
constructive mathematics of providing no really viable alternative, until the amount
of work which is put on it remains marginal; this is as silly as rejecting something
like electric or hydrogen cars, comparing them with a Ferrari before they are properly
developed and forgetting that their purpose is diCerent.
The analogy with ecology is so strict and illuminating that it can be taken as a
guide. In this terms, my general proposal becomes simply common sense: do now all
what is possible to preserve integrity of the mathematical environment, in all its forms,
and to improve the quality of life in it. So the vitality of mathematics should not be
measured only by the number of theorems produced. To the contrary, just as producing
more cars brings to more chaos and traMc jams, a blind overproduction of theorems
at any cost has the negative eCect that their meaning and signi)cance are lost. It is
no longer clear what the real progress is. A good discipline to recover meaning is the
ecological principle of producing theorems with a minimal use of conceptual resources,
that is, in the weakest possible foundation. Most mathematicians, while being careful
in choosing a minimal stock of axioms for their theories, have little or no scruple about
axioms in their meta-theories. The enormous waste of foundational assumptions is made
worse by the little knowledge of their impact on the environment and on the theories
themselves. For instance, little is known about the pollution they produce, in the sense
of the collapse of diCerent notions and hence the death of important distinctions of
meaning. One observable negative eCect is the diMculty in building safe mathematics
and hence safe computer programs.
Similarly, one should avoid waste of ad hoc de)nitions, which are easy to produce
but diMcult to recycle, like plastic products. They are often broken after short use, but
remain there and overpopulate our mental space.
In the world of mathematics, the various kinds of environments are just the dif-
ferent kinds of mathematics provided by various foundations. As in the biosphere,
plurality is an essential ingredient of life and hence a source of richness. To save
biodiversity one has to take care and keep each foundation alive and in good health,
by exploring and actively developing the speci)c mathematics it gives rise to. Here
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there is a lot of mathematical work waiting for somebody to do it. To be able to
see it, one must )rst simply abandon the strong principles without fears, just like
to be able to see alternatives to cars one must )rst leave one’s own car in the
garage.
Exploring the world of mathematics with a weak foundation is like travelling on foot
or riding a bicycle, rather than by car or plane. The pleasure is not that of possessing
as many places as possible by passing through them, but of getting familiar with the
landscape and harmonious with nature. In this way, one can observe many facts which
otherwise, due to speed or distance, would remain unnoticed. This means acquiring a
kind of knowledge which is impossible otherwise. Moreover, a considerable side eCect
is that of avoiding crowds (up to now, at least).
Taking care of aesthetics is a good antidote against the uglyness of plastic de)nitions,
the absurdities of wasting the foundational resources, and the will of power over the
environment. In fact, it seems to me that our sense of beauty is a deep sign of harmony
between our internal world and the perceivable world. In mathematics, it is usually
called elegant, or even beautiful, what pleases our need of appropriate mental structures.
I believe that mathematicians with some maturity or sensitivity can understand what
I mean without further explanations; or at least, they have certainly experienced it
sometimes. This is why in my own exploration I have often let myself be inspired by
my aesthetic discernment.
Certainly the inevitable day should be hastened when humanity will realize that its
present behaviour is destroying the world. Unfortunately, this has already happened
locally in the past; with globalization and increase of power, there is now much more
at stake. Luckily, this is not a direct eCect of careless mathematics, but perhaps it
is precisely from mathematics that one can begin to develop a new, more respectful
culture and view of the world. Leaving any dream of absolute virtual power and going
out of the world they have built for this purpose, mathematicians can become aware
and responsible of their limited but real power. The new conception of constructivism
is not a doctrine which is born out of new dogmas or restrictions. It is just the wish
of a real, trustable knowledge in harmony with nature, inside and outside our brains,
and that is in the end just love and respect of oneself and the others.
3.2. More concrete points in topology
3.2.1. Mathematics and computers
One should give for granted, I believe, that the role of computers in mathematics
is going to increase in the future. Computers will be used not only as calculators, but
also as assistants in the task of developing mathematics and checking it to be correct
and safe. To this aim, mathematics must be formalized in a programming language.
One of the most intriguing aspects of Martin-L2of ’s type theory is that two impor-
tant motivations, namely the foundation of constructive mathematics and of computing
science, converge to the same result. In fact, type theory has shown that the detailed
formalization of an intuitionistic and predicative set theory becomes ipso facto the
speci)cation of a high level programming language (see [27,26,30]).
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The same holds for mathematics, and not only its foundation. To obtain a piece of
mathematics which can be implemented in a machine, the most eCective method is
just to develop it directly within type theory. In this way the philosophical arguments
in favour of constructive mathematics converge with (or are replaced by, according to
taste) a practical, non-ideological motivation.
To be able to express a speci)c de)nition or theorem in type theory one often
has to reduce it to its deepest constituents and understand it so well that it is no
wonder that the computational meaning can come to surface in the form of a com-
puter program. In practice, however, the full formalism of type theory is so detailed
that a piece of mathematics written with no abbreviations becomes unreadable to the
standard mathematicians. This is not a defect of type theory, since it is designed pre-
cisely for a careful preservation of all the information, even that which is redundant
in usual mathematics; actually, type theory is totally trustable because of this. But
if the aim is to provide mathematicians with an assistant to their activity, it is a
task of the assistant to understand the language of mathematicians. This is the aim
of building up a toolbox for type theory, that is an interface providing type theory
with notions and notations which on one hand allow the mathematicians to work in
their usual way, but on the other hand guarantee that the computational content is not
lost (see Section 3.1.3). Even if the language is standard, methods of proof remain
fully intuitionistic and predicative. So the price that mathematicians have to pay is the
development of a new mathematical intuition, and this requires time and education;
note however that this holds also for the intuition underlying classical or impredicative
mathematics, even if a posteriori it is given for granted. Another price to pay is the
development of the toolbox and of its implementation. It seems just reasonable to try
and make each tool as independent as possible of speci)c implementations of type
theory (since these change quickly, while mathematics should remain more stable).
For instance, the whole theory of subsets depends only on two simple conditions (see
Section 1.3.1), whose implementation can change at will without aCecting the tool of
subsets.
The presence of a toolbox for type theory makes the interaction between mathematics
and computer science simpler and more intense at the same time. As long as they use
only the toolbox, mathematicians can continue their job with no worry about making
their results closer to formalization in type theory, to please the person who is going
to do it. They are responsible, so to say, from toolbox up. And still they know that
their results can be mechanically checked and proved to be safe. Computer scientists
should not worry about formalizing all what mathematicians produce, but should take
care only of what is necessary to implement the toolbox. They are responsible from
toolbox down.
If the aim of formalizing mathematics is to mechanically check its safety, some kind
of tool is not only useful, but also theoretically necessary. In fact, what would be the
gain in safety if a vast amount of human work is necessary to bring mathematics inside
a formalism? How is that checked?
The development of a rich toolbox should therefore be of general interest. The single
tool of subsets has been enough, up to now, for the purpose of developing formal
topology. So, in particular, all the mathematical development in this paper really is
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automatically formalizable in type theory, hence mechanically checkable and (most
probably) safe.
3.2.2. Do points exist?
The predicative approach to topology leads in a natural way to the consideration
of opens as given primitively, i.e. to the so called pointfree or formal approach (see
[25,21]; the name is due to the fact that an open subset is only formally so, from the
traditional perspective at least, since it does not consist in a subset of points). Actually,
as I will show below, predicative topology must contain the formal approach. For this
reason, it is sometimes believed that it must coincide with it.
Beginning in particular with the emergence of the basic picture, I have been de-
veloping a change in conceptual understanding, which now looks to me as the most
reasonable and open minded. One can summarize it in three points as follows:
(a) Keep concrete points, when there are some. It is a task of the predicative foun-
dation and its users to distinguish concrete points from formal points, that is concrete
spaces from formal spaces.
(b) Reappraisal of the pointfree approach not as a substitute of the pointwise one,
but as interesting in its own right.
(c) Develop an intuitionistic and predicative topology as a primitive, and not as a
way to recover as much as possible of classical topology. This must then lead to some
new mathematics (see Section 3.1.4).
I now try to explain these points in all details, but not singularly since they are
strictly interconnected.
The whole basic picture was born by analysing as deeply as possible the de)nition
of formal topology given in [32], with the aim of improving on it. The idea is to
study in detail the case of a topological space X in which the topology OX can be
concretely presented by means of a base of open subsets indexed by a second set S.
To this aim, as with topological systems introduced by Steve Vickers in [48], one has
to keep both the points and the structure of opens in one framework, to be able to
formulate better their mutual relationship. A topological system is a triple (X;  ;L)
where X is a set of points, L is a frame (or locale) with a set S of elements and 
is a relation between X and S binding points with the structure of L in the expected
way (that is, x 1, x a ∧ b if and only if x a and x b, x ∨i∈I bi if and only if
there exists i∈ I such that x bi). This de)nition is meant to include the case in which
X is formed by all completely prime )lters, alias formal points of L. Indeed, so it is,
impredicatively; predicatively, such X is not a set, since it is a collection of subsets
of S. A predicative version of Vickers’ de)nition could then be: a triple (X;  ;S)
where X is a collection of points, S is a formal topology and  binds X with S in
the expected way (that is, as in the de)nition of formal point, see Section 2.4). This
de)nition would include formal spaces, that is triples (Pt(S);  ;S) where Pt(S)
is the collection of formal points of S, and  is of course reverse membership. It
would however not allow an easy analysis, since quanti)cations over Pt(S) are not
meaningful predicatively. So one has to take courage and restrict to the case in which
X is a set also predicatively. In this way formal spaces are ruled out, but this is
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compensated by other important advantages. In fact, one can always de)ne a formal
cover / on S by quantifying over points in X (which is now possible, since X is a
set) and by putting a / U ≡ (∀x∈X )(x a → (∃b  U )(x b)). Of course one can
also de)ne Pos by putting Pos(a) ≡ (∃x∈X )(x a). Moreover, one can get rid of
1 and the operation · by introducing ↓ (as explained in Section 2.1) and thus in the
end obtain a formal topology (S; /; Pos), as de)ned in Section 2.1. So the assumption
that S comes equipped with the structure of a frame (or of formal topology) can be
dispensed with, and one is left with the notion of concrete space (see Sections 1.1
and 2.1; the sign  remains as a trace of the link with [48]).
An extra bene)t, which was not expected, is that the expression of the fact that S
gives a base for OX takes the form of two conditions, called B1 and B2, to be put
on top of the relation . Then one can realize that the usual de7nition of open and
of closed subsets of X is possible also when B1 and B2 are not assumed to hold. So
one can further reduce to the most simple structure consisting of the sets X , S and
the now arbitrary relation  between them; the properties B1 and B2 can be added at
will.
This is the conceptual path which brings to basic pairs, and to see them as a general-
ization of concrete spaces (which impredicatively are the same as topological spaces).
Now this path can be reversed and one can use the ground notion of basic pair as a
starting point to get a uni)ed and deeper perspective on topology, formal topology in
particular. In fact, a basic pair is the most elementary structure in which topological
notions can be anatomized and reduced to their deepest essence. By analysing basic
pairs, one discovers that the notions of open and closed are linked by a logical duality,
and that the concrete side (of concrete points) and the formal side (of formal basic
neighbourhoods, or observables) are linked by symmetry (see Section 2.2). The geo-
metrical and topological intuition is thus supported by a solid structure, which one can
then extend to less elementary situations. In practice, duality and symmetry are kept
as guiding principles for a correct further development.
The examples of basic pairs, and hence also of concrete spaces, are not so many
predicatively, and perhaps also not so interesting. The reason for introducing formal
topologies is precisely to obtain a more general approach. One can then generalize also
the notion of point by introducing formal points over a formal topology and hence
)nally also that of concrete space by introducing formal spaces. Thus the )rst task is
that of )nding a correct de)nition of formal topology; this is the main purpose of the
detailed analysis of the case in which points do form a set. In fact, the de)nition of
formal topology is obtained by abstraction of the structure induced on the formal side
of a concrete space. In other words, let us call this structure a (concretely) presentable
formal topology; then we de)ne formal topologies abstractly by requiring as axioms
those properties which are valid in the subclass of presentable formal topologies. It is
clear that in this way the importance of the notion of formal topology is not diminished,
and that the number of spaces which can be presented concretely is not increased
(certainly not by subtly weakening the conception of constructivity). What is increased
is the epistemological value which is given to the special class of presentable formal
topologies, that is in the end concrete spaces. They are seen as a lucky case in which
one can analyse with all comforts the links between (concrete) points and (formal)
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opens, as well as the eCects they produce on the formal side, which are later to be
taken as axioms. And this idea would continue to work well even if the only interesting
concrete spaces were the )nite ones.
The discoveries reached through the analysis of the special case in which concrete
points do form a set result in some conceptual improvements on formal notions. The
)rst is that one can consider basic pairs, rather than concrete spaces, and hence intro-
duce the new notion of formal basic topology (see Section 2.4), which is obtained by
abstraction of the structure induced on the formal side of a basic pair. As a concrete
space is nothing but a basic pair in which (B1 and) B2 hold, so the de)nition of formal
topology is now obtained as a special case by adding as axiom the property which is
induced by B2 on the formal side, and this is ↓-Right (see Section 2.4). This is the
beginning of a generalization of formal topology, which is a part of what I called the
basic picture. Another improvement is that one can rely on the symmetry between the
concrete and the formal side of a basic pair, and hence transfer the duality between
concrete open and closed subsets also to the formal side; this means that it becomes
natural to introduce a new relation, namely the (binary) positivity predicate  which
is dual to the cover /. This brings a long standing problem to solution, namely the
de)nition of a good predicative notion of formal closed subset.
All other notions of formal topology can be introduced by following the same method
as described above. In this way one arrives at the notions of formal continuous relation
and of formal map (see Section 2.4), and at that of formal point (see Section 2.4 and
below). One could then say that formal topology is obtained by “forgetting” concrete
points and thus by describing a concrete space (or more generally a basic pair) by using
only what is available on its formal side, that of the set S. I hope it is clear by now that
this is a colourful but approximate way of speaking, which can be useful for starting
intuition. Though formal notions are introduced starting from concretely presentable
ones, the aim remains that of reaching more general notions; if all formal (basic)
topologies had happened to be concretely presentable, their introduction would have
been much less motivated. The real raison d’eˆtre of formal topology is to include some
topological structures which otherwise would be inaccessible to a predicative treatment.
Thus, as was the case with the rejection of excluded third, the formal approach
should be perceived positively as an enrichment of topology, rather than negatively
as a complicated way to mimick predicatively the results of impredicative topology.
The notions of formal topology and of formal space are put aside that of concrete
space, and they do not replace it. They are new conceptual tools, with their own
results and techniques, like inductive generation, which often have no analogue in
the pointwise approach. So in particular they are not just a skilful device to study
topological spaces better, by simplifying proofs or other technical improvements. Also,
they are not only a way to obtain more points, by the introduction of formal points (as
discussed below). In many cases it happens that the collection of formal points over a
formal topology can be indexed by a set; so the formal topology could possibly even
become concretely presentable. But this is conceptually only a posteriori, and hence
still the formal de)nition remains more natural and simple.
Formal topology provides us with another source of re)nement of conceptual tools,
and that is the distinction between concrete and formal points. The reason for intro-
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ducing formal points is best understood by assuming the constructive viewpoint as an
improvement on the quality of knowledge, rather than as doing without “strong” prin-
ciples. Their aim is simply to increase expressive power while keeping constructivity.
In fact, in the classical approach the most important examples of topological spaces are
formed by points, like real numbers, in)nitely proceeding sequences, etc., which con-
tain, or are determined by, an in)nite amount of information. Constructively, the only
possibility is to conceive them as ideally determined by better and better approxima-
tions. One usually gives mathematical form to this idea by de7ning such ideal points
as the collection of all the approximations. This is also the course taken in formal
topology. In fact, a formal point of any formal topology S will be a subset  of the
set S such that it makes sense to think of a   as meaning that the observable a is
an approximation of . To obtain a precise de)nition, one follows the same general
method as described above for the de)nition of formal topologies. So one considers
the case in which S is concretely presentable and takes the pointfree properties of
the subset ✸x, which is the trace on S of a concrete point x∈X , as the conditions to
de)ne a subset ⊆ S to be a formal point. The same conditions are then used to de)ne
formal points over an arbitrary formal topology (see Section 2.4). One could say that
a subset  is a formal point if it enjoys enough properties to make it indistinguishable,
in the presentable case, from (the trace of) a concrete point.
The collection of all formal points of S is denoted by Pt(S), and it is called a
formal space. From a constructive point of view, it is important to keep points which
are given concretely, i.e. concrete points, well distinct from points which are only
ideally so, i.e. formal points. It is the predicative foundation given by type theory,
with its distinction between set and collection (or type), which allows one, and in the
same time compels one to take care of this. In fact, each formal point is a subset
of S, and hence Pt(S) is a collection of subsets, which is not a set. In particular,
quanti)cations over formal points are in general not meaningful. So the distinction
between concrete points (when they exist) and formal points is simply that the former
are elements and form a set, while the latter are subsets and do not. This distinction is
lost in an impredicative approach, where Pt(S) (or some other equivalent formulation)
is considered to be a set as good as any other. So one can see that in a predicative
approach formal points are not an option to reconstruct something which is there in
any case, but a necessity to be able to deal with some spaces unreachable otherwise.
In this precise sense, formal topology is predicatively not a luxury, but a must.
On the other hand, it should also be clear that in my opinion formal points are not a
substitute to soothe the pain for the loss of concrete points. One should not use energy
to avoid concrete points as evil, but to keep them distinct from the formal ones. The
aim is just to develop topology predicatively, and also concrete points have shown to
be useful in this respect.
The attitude described here can be traced back to 1873, when Dedekind introduced
his rigorous explanation of the continuum. In his Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen,
he analysed the eCect of a concrete point, that is a rational number, on the set of
approximations, and discovered that it gives what we now call a Dedekind cut. Then
he reversed the perspective, and said that for any Dedekind cut one creates a new, ideal
number. It was only later that Dedekind cuts, though in)nite entities, were treated as
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concretely given objects. With the help of a predicative set theory, we can now refrain
from that step. Formal topology is the general result growing out of this. So one
could say that classical topology has been obtained from topology by “forgetting” that
Pt(S) is not a set, and hence also “forgetting” that half of topology which we now
call pointfree or formal.
3.2.3. Deep connection between logic and topology
The basic picture shows that two sets linked by a relation are enough to give a
beginning to topology, or at least to something very close to what is usually meant
by topology. In fact, usual topology is obtained just by introducing the property of
convergence of approximations, and this can be done quite easily by adding a condition
on top of each de)nition.
On the other hand, the basic picture is in essence just the study of images of subsets
along a relation, and such images are de)ned in terms of logical constants and quanti-
)ers. Moreover, subsets themselves are just propositional functions. So one cannot be
wrong to say that the basic picture is just applied logic. It comes from the dynamics
between two sets which is induced by logic. That is precisely why I have called it the
basic picture.
From the perspective of logic, the basic picture shows that topology is simply the
study of combinations of quanti)ers by means of de)nitions which put into action a
spatial intuition. One could say that it gives a visual meaning to some combination of
quanti)ers.
From the perspective of topology, the basic picture oCers a unifying structure which
underlies the common topological de)nitions and thus a way to understand their deepest
meaning. In this sense, it is a foundation of topology which is independent of any
standard foundational theory.
In general, it seems safe to say that after the discovery of the basic picture the
connection between logic and topology appears to be much deeper than it looked
before.
3.2.4. Nothing wrong with axiomatic de7nitions
Some constructivists tend to believe constructive mathematics to be incompatible,
perhaps even antithetic to the axiomatic method. This attitude is probably due to his-
torical contingencies, bound to the formalistic foundation of mathematics as a purely
linguistic game, but it has apparently no other reasonable motivation nowadays. An
abstract, axiomatic de)nition can be useful in constructive mathematics in the same
way as it is in classical mathematics (and which goes well beyond the formalistic
view on foundations). First of all, it has the well-known and prosaic purpose of saving
work, by )nding those properties which hold in a variety of examples. In this way it
can help the development of an abstract intuition, which may have a structural, logical
or geometrical nature. This too might be a reason for the opposition of many construc-
tivists who see, as Bishop did, the computational content as the only ingredient which
should give meaning to mathematics. But this looks to me as irrational as forbidding
oneself the use of knives because other people use them for bad purposes. In fact, one
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should trust in oneself and just avoid destructive misuse; the development of the ax-
iomatic theory is fully independent of the way in which examples of it are conceived.
These can (and must) remain as constructive as desired.
The lack of a tradition with axiomatic de)nitions in the )eld of constructive math-
ematics is not a good reason to take a classical de)nition for granted and just try
to adapt it as well as possible to a constructive language. A reasonable criterion is
that a good de)nition is the right compromise between convenience and faithfulness
to reality, that is preservation of information. This is the criterion I followed in my
choice of de)nitions in the speci)c case of the basic picture and formal topology. As
a consequence, in the de)nition of formal topology I have not taken as axiom all what
is valid in a concrete space (that is, a topological space to the eyes of classicists).
The criterion of validity in a topological space is certainly important, but not the only
one. There is no good reason to assume topological spaces as given in the same way
as reality, transcending historical and human choices, and hence to conceive of formal
topology as all what can be said about classical points without ever mentioning them.
The de)nition of formal topology has its own status and autonomy (even if, of course,
future understanding might change its present form).
More speci)cally, I have not taken the property of positivity (that is, Pos(a) →
a / U=a / U , see Section 1.2 and footnote 13) as axiom. This allows to avoid prob-
lems with compacti)cations (see footnote 13); the compacti)cation of a formal basic
topology and of a formal topology (at least when it is provided with an operation ·
as in De)nition 1) now gives no problems. Note also that if two formal topologies
S and S′ diCer only in the sense that S′ is obtained from S by adding positivity
as an axiom in the generation of the cover, then S and S′ produce the same formal
space. The most important advantage is however that in this way the de)nition is kept
simple, general and (hopefully) deep.
For this same reason, I also believe that inductive generation should not be a part
of the de)nition (this is also the choice taken in [10]). In fact, it can become a burden
(also an impossible task, in some cases, see [10]) to prove a cover to be inductively
generated when it is given by an elementary or an algebraic de)nition. Finally, avoiding
the complexities of inductive generation in the abstract de)nition (one should always
ask for the presence of an axiom set I; C, see [10] or also Section 2.6 here) looks
to me as an example of good will in the eCort of communication with the classical
tradition.
3.2.5. Fun in doing constructive mathematics
One of the deep motivations pushing one into mathematical research is that one has
fun in doing it. Working mathematicians know that fun is a sign for good mathematics.
This is perhaps because fun is a measure of involvement and excitement for discoveries.
One of the deep reasons for little interest in constructive mathematics is, in my
opinion, the prejudice that it must be terribly boring. Analysing how this prejudice
was born is not easy, since it involves history, education, foundational attitude and
even the global view of the world. It seems that it is due mainly to two reasons. One
is that constructivity is often felt only as a moral duty, and this is often supposed to
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kill any fun. This is certainly due also to convinced constructivists themselves, who do
not insist enough on the advantages, which are not only of moral nature, accompanying
such a “duty”, and hence which make it worthwhile. The other is simply the common,
unjusti)ed and condemnable ignorance about constructive mathematics. One just cannot
have fun with something totally unfamiliar.
Explaining to some people why doing constructive mathematics can be fun, is just
like explaining them why they should laugh for a certain joke. Terrible. What I can do
is just on one hand to present myself as an example, and swear that I have real fun
when I work, and on the other hand to warn that the kind of fun is a bit diCerent from
that experienced with classical mathematics. In fact, it is certainly true that working in
constructive mathematics is conceptually more complex than in classical mathematics.
Before having fun, one has to get a bit familiar with a foundation which is more com-
plex than the classical one, and hence also to acquire a speci)c intuition. For a reader
with a classical education, this means also abandoning some familiar schemes, and let
oneself go into new mental structures. In return, one gets much more than in classical
mathematics: computational meaning, safety, consistency, quality of information, con-
tact with reality, etc. So the fun will be less infantile than in classical mathematics,
since the exploration is deeper.
It has been a source of intense excitement for me to discover the beginning of the
basic picture and to see how the correct de)nitions came out by purely structural rea-
sons. Now there are several further topics which need exploration, which I expect to be
great fun to do. Here are just a few examples: proof theoretic methods in topology (e.g.
the problem in Section 1.3.6), co-induction, topology and mathematics with  and G
(see Section 2.7), diCerent assumptions on  and Pos, and their role, compacti)cations
of formal (basic) topologies, etc.
I also expect many other interesting results to be found. In fact, using a new, con-
structive net does not mean throwing back to sea the treasures of mathematics so dear
to Hilbert, but to the contrary it allows to acquire new treasures, which Hilbert could
not see (or didn’t want to).
3.2.6. Brouwer
Almost one century after Brouwer’s beginning, it would be extremely interesting to
read his writings again and carefully analyse his thought and his mathematics at the
light of more recent developments of constructive mathematics, also in its connection
with computers. A relaxed, less biased view should now be possible.
The diMculties of Brouwer’s character (to which in the end all the diMculties in his
thought can be reduced, like his tendency to solipsism and to polemics) should not
prevent one from recognizing him as a pioneer and a prophet of exceptional depth.
His insights, perhaps not all yet appreciated, began the creation of a whole new world
and way of thinking.
The best way to continue his work is to follow his spirit, rather than his letter, in the
development of mathematics. In particular, we are now free to look in a more relaxed
way at some topics so dear to Brouwer in all his life, like choice sequences, continuity
principles and bar induction, and which make intuitionistic mathematics incompatible
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with classical mathematics. They are certainly extremely interesting and subtle prob-
lems, but I believe not the essence of constructivity. Incompatibility remains, but it
is more a matter of conceptual views than of speci)c mathematical principles. Still, a
minimalist foundation, in which the axiom of choice is not valid and which is compati-
ble with a direct intuition of continuity, could be the correct basis to address Brouwer’s
problems. In particular, an improvement on the attitude described in [32, Section 9],
seems now possible. One of my main aims there was the representation of choice se-
quences as formal points. But one can show that, if the axiom of choice is assumed
to hold, as I did, the presence of ∃ in the conclusion of the main condition of formal
points brings to a function, so that the corresponding sequence is lawlike. I proposed
in [32] to weaken that condition, by adding a double negation in front of ∃. (The sug-
gestion was followed in [45] to obtain a formal space of “weak formal reals” which
satis)es completeness.) This surely blocks the application of the axiom of choice, but
vanishes the aim of identifying choice sequences with formal points. Now one can see
the way out: the de)nition of formal point, being fully structural, is correct as it is.
What is to be changed is the foundation: it is a foundation with no axiom of choice
which allows one to identify choice sequences with formal points, since the argument
showing that a formal point gives a lawlike sequence is no longer possible.
3.2.7. Bishop
In all his writings, Bishop insists on the idea of giving meaning to mathematics
only through its computational content. He rightly does not identify mathematics with
computer computation: “Because the computer is lacking in judgement, the theorems
of constructive mathematics do not in general represent computer programs. They rep-
resent person programs, which in some instances can be transformed into computer
programs and in other instances cannot.” ([4, pp. 354–355]). However, in his writings
he seems to ignore that mathematics is done by persons using also spatial intuition,
or continuity, and abstract mental structures, or logic. Reducing everything to a single
ingredient, like Pythagoreans, is no winning strategy. In particular, Bishop’s opposition
to general topology seems to me just as a mistake: “the Hamboyant engine” of general
topology has already “collapsed to constructive size” ([4, p. 63]), and that is through
formal topology.
3.3. Pointless endless metare4ections
The paper is now )nally completed and, as with any piece of work in which I have
been deeply involved, I deliver it with some trepidation. How will the readers receive
it? After long doubts, I now believe it is pointless for me to suggest how they should.
I believe that in the very end my duty towards life and evolution is just to preserve
biodiversity in a cultural sense. So I )rst must exploit fully and personally the most
precious organ I have as a human being, namely my brain, with no delegation to other
brains, and then I must make the results available to others. That duty, at the moment,
has been accomplished. As suggested by Bertolt Brecht (in his Leben des Galilei),
after dreaming like Galilei, I now prefer to go back to the humble wisdom of Frau
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Sarti:
Galilei (frCuhstCuckend): “Auf Grund unserer Forschungen, Frau Sarti, haben
[... wir...] Entdekkungen gemacht, die wir nicht lCanger der Welt gegenCuber
geheimhalten kConnen. Eine neue Zeit ist angebrochen, ein groGes Zeitalter, in
dem zu leben eine Lust ist.”
Frau Sarti: “So. HoIentlich kConnen wir auch den Milchmann bezahlen in
dieser neuen Zeit, Herr Galilei.” 15
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